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ABSTRACT 
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: 
WHY NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM 
WAS PASSED IN 2010 DESPITE 
PUBLIC OPIMON AGAINST IT 
by 
Walter Tibbetts 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2011 
Usually the will of the people is reflected in public policy on such a salient 
issue as health care. This was the case with Medicare in 1965 and President 
Clinton's health care reform efforts in 1993-4. However, this was not the case in 
2010, when President Obama's health care plan was passed despite 53 percent 
of the American people being against it. 
The subject of this case study is the anomaly that was the 2009-2010 
health care reform debate and vote. The relationship between public opinion and 
public policy is explored, and a narrative of the 2009-2010 health care debate is 
presented. 
The conclusion describes the passage of the health care bill, despite 
public opinion being against it, as being the result of the convergence of many 
factors, especially ideology, elite cues, polarization, and a strong sense of 
urgency, which came together in a perfect storm of events. 
VII 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2010 President Barack Obama signed into law a 
monumental piece of health care legislation; so monumental, that at the signing 
ceremony Vice President Biden proclaimed: "This is a big f—ing deal (Benin 
2010)!" National health care reform was indeed a big deal, not only because it 
was an important and far-reaching bill, but also because it was passed without 
the consent of the governed, since public opinion was against its passage. 
This is an anomaly, as usually the will of the people is reflected in policy 
on such a salient issue as health care. For example, 62 percent of the American 
public supported the Medicare program in February 1965. Medicare passed in 
June 1965, and by December of that year, public support for the program had 
increased to 82 percent (Erikson 2010). 
The health care debate of 1993-94 was another example of policy 
reflecting public opinion on a salient issue. President Clinton's health care 
proposal, the Health Security Act, became more and more unpopular to the 
American public as the debate progressed. Consequently, the HSA was never 
even brought up for a vote in Congress. 
However, President Obama's health care reform was passed in March 
2010, even though public opinion polls reported that 53 percent of the American 
public was against the plan. This is an intellectual dilemma, a great puzzle. Why 
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did the 2010 health care bill pass without the consent of the governed? One 
could label this an outlier or deviant case; it certainly was an unusual situation. 
The health care debate of 2009-2010 was also a unique opportunity for 
the public to follow the legislative process, become informed, and develop and 
express opinions. The New York Times wrote: 
[TJhere has rarely been a legislative debate like this one -
stretching over more than a year, echoing from the Capitol 
and the White House to town halls, radio shows and cable 
stations. In this new world, anyone who wants to follow the 
debate can; there seems to be an infinite number of platforms 
serving up detailed parliamentary motion-to-motion accounts 
of what's taking place. In many ways, the health care battle 
has turned into a grand, if not entirely inspiring, civics lessons 
on Congressional procedure (Nagoumey 2010). 
This thesis is a case study which looks at a case of great importance: The 
2009-2010 health care reform debate. Van Evera wrote that one of the purposes 
of case studies is "explaining cases of intrinsic importance (2007, 55)." The 
health care bill which ultimately passed in March 2010 is a striking example of 
policy conflicting with public opinion on a salient issue. The research design for 
this paper is a qualitative case study approach in which "[t]he researcher collects 
open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing themes from 
the data (Creswell 2003, 18)." 
This thesis focuses on public opinion and policy, and also the four 
elements which most affected the policy-making process in this particular case: 
ideology, elite cues, polarization, and a sense of urgency. These four elements 
form the basis of the hypothesis, which is: 
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The health care bill of 2010 was passed despite public opinion being against it 
due to the convergence of many factors, especially ideology, elite cues, 
polarization, and a strong sense of urgency. 
It is the great sense of urgency which acted as a catalyst with ideology, 
elite cues, and polarization, allowing this anomaly to occur. This case, the 2009-
2010 health care debate, is an unusual example of policy-makers passing an 
important bill on a salient issue against the will of the people, that is, contrary to 
public opinion. The case study approach allows us to closely look at the events 
and processes that made this outcome possible. 
Chapter One begins with a review of the literature on public opinion and 
policy, and public opinion and health care; the consent of the governed and 
polarization are also discussed. 
Chapter Two describes the Model of Public Opinion and Policy, in which 
are presented the many variables which affect public opinion and public policy. It 
must be stressed that the Model is large and complex, in order to present the 
whole picture. However, this thesis will only focus on the parts of the Model that 
pertain to the case at hand; the Model serves as a framework for the later 
narration of events. 
Chapter Three explains previous health care initiatives, and how public 
opinion affected policy in the cases of Medicare in 1965, and President Clinton's 
health care reform efforts of 1993-94. 
Chapter Four is a narrative of the health care debate of 2009-2010. 
Because it is important to understand why public opinion was against health care 
reform in this case, those reasons are explained, and divided into three 
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categories: The premise, the product and the process. The topics of ideology and 
elite cues are also discussed. 
Chapter Five is a narrative of the events which took place after the March 
2010 signing of the health care bill. Topics included are the November 2010 
election, public opinion, and court cases concerning the bill. 
Chapter Six, the conclusion section of the thesis, answers the question: 
"Why did the massive health care bill pass against the wishes of the American 
public?" The four elements of the perfect storm are described, with emphasis on 
the great sense of urgency. It is hoped that by closely examining the events of 
2009-2010 in terms of the dynamics of public opinion and policy, readers will 
come to a better understanding of this anomaly. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY 
The Literature 
Abraham Lincoln said: "Public opinion is everything. With it nothing can 
fail, without it nothing can succeed (Schlesinger 1965, 88)." Regarding public 
opinion and policy, Cook wrote that "[a] fundamental goal in most democratic 
societies is a close connection between citizens' preferences and public policies 
(2002, 142)." 
V.O. Key defined public opinion as "the sentiments government finds it 
necessary to heed (Herbst 1998, 57)." That is an excellent definition, in that 
public opinion should have some effect on public policy; in order to govern with 
the consent of the governed (and in order to get re-elected), policy-makers must 
heed the opinion of the public and be aware of the public mood. 
Edmund Burke thought otherwise. He described elected officials as either 
1) delegates, who represent the opinions of the people; or 2) trustees, who use 
their own judgment, even if it differs from public opinion. Preferring the latter 
position, Burke felt that an elected official owes his or her constituent "his 
unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience...Your 
representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays 
you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion (Lambino 2010)." An elected official should 
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be both a trustee and a delegate, using good judgment and common sense while 
considering the wishes of constituents. 
According to James Madison, the role of public opinion in affecting public 
policy should be minimal. Madison was concerned with the mischief of factions 
and the rights of the minority, writing that "measures are too often decided, not 
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minority party, but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority (Madison 1999, 45)." 
Page and Shapiro (1992) had a differing viewpoint; they wrote that 
"ordinary citizens are not to be feared, that governments should respond to their 
wishes, and that the politically active should learn more about what the public 
wants (ix)." Jacobs and Shapiro, in their book Politicians Don't Pander (2000), 
argued that modern policy-makers, when not up for election, routinely ignore 
public opinion in favor of their own beliefs, and those of their contributors and 
interest group allies; that politicians track public opinion, not to aid in making 
policy, but to determine how to craft public statements and actions to win support 
for their policies. Jacobs and Shapiro were concerned with reclaiming democracy 
when they wrote: 
The continued slippage in government responsiveness threatens 
the foundation of our democratic order and the meaning of rule 
by and for the people. Whether democratic government survives 
is not foreordained or guaranteed; it is the challenge of each gen-
eration to be vigilant and reassert its importance. Insisting that 
politicians follow the popular will and allow citizens to engage in 
unfettered public debate is central to that struggle (Jacobs and 
Shapiro 2000, 339). 
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Farber and Frickey, writing about economic theories of legislation, 
described two types of models dealing with what legislators must do to win 
reelection: 
Models in the first group assume that legislators attempt to 
maximize their appeal to their constituents. These constitu-
ents, in turn, vote according to their own economic self-in-
terest. Thus these models suggest that legislative votes 
should be highly predictable on the basis of the economic 
Interests of constituents. 
Models in the second group emphasize the role of special 
interest groups. To the extent that voters lack perfect infor-
mation about a legislator's conduct, his financial backing, 
publicity, and endorsements become more important. 
These forms of support, as well as other possible benefits, 
are provided by organized interest groups, which thereby 
acquire the ability to affect legislative action (Mikva and 
Lane 2009, 17). 
When we study President Clinton's health care reform efforts of 1993-94, 
we shall see a model from the second group; special interests had a major role in 
shaping legislative action, or lack of it, in that case. 
In the case of President Obama's health care reform efforts of 2009-2010, 
however, we should see a model from the first group, in which the economic 
interests of the public predict the outcome of the vote on the health care bill. The 
fact that this did not occur is the crux of this thesis: The economic interests of the 
public were not respected; the opinion of the public was not followed; the health 
care bill of 2010 was passed without the consent of the governed. This anomaly 
will be studied in more detail later in this thesis. However, for the time being, we 
must recognize that there is at times a strong relationship between public opinion 
and the actions of elected officials, which results in public policy. Erikson and 
Tedin wrote: 
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Although the evidence is certainly incomplete, the few relevant 
studies that test for an opinion-policy linkage suggest that 
public opinion is far from inconsequential. At the national 
level, we find that opinion and national policy are in agreement 
more often than not (Erikson and Tedin 2007, 331). 
Manza and Cook (2002) wrote that "the relationship between citizens' 
opinions and the policy output of governments is strong...[C]ase studies have 
included public opinion as an explanatory variable, usually reporting] significant 
effects (28)." Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson studied public opinion and policy, 
and developed a macro system model which showed a causal relationship 
between the two. They wrote: "We postulate that rational politicians who wish to 
succeed in future elections and reelections use current public opinion as lever-
age in the calculation of which positions are dangerous or advantageous (Erikson 
2002, 39)." 
Page and Shapiro (1983) found a connection between changes in 
preferences and changes in policies by "[examining public opinion and policy 
data for the United States from 1935 to 1975 (175)". They wrote that "[pjolicy 
tends to move in the same direction as public opinion (ibid, 181)", especially 
when the issues are salient. A salient issue is one which is stands out 
conspicuously and is prominent or striking. Saliency, wrote Rochefort and Boyer 
(1988) occurs when "most people are aware of the problem and express strong 
feelings about it (650)." An example of a salient issue would be the civil rights 
movement of the 1960's, where "opinion change probably contributed to policy 
change (Page and Shapiro 1983, 186)." 
Page and Shapiro gave this warning pertaining to public opinion and 
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policy, which should be considered when one studies President Clinton's 1993-
94 health care reform efforts: 
Even if public opinion is truly a proximate cause of policy, 
it may itself be affected by factors not wholly compatible 
with normative concepts of democracy. If, for example, in-
terest groups or politicians manage to manipulate opinion 
through lies or deception, and policy subsequently responds 
to the manipulated opinion, we would hesitate to celebrate 
the result as a democratic one (Page and Shapiro 1983, 189). 
Public Opinion and Health Care 
Richard Chard wrote about what he called "the mediating effect" of public 
opinion on public policy, specifically in the realm of health care. Chard felt that 
citizen preferences play a small but significant role in shaping health care policy 
and that "although public opinion does not dictate public policy, there are indeed 
mediating influences on policy from various aspects of public opinion (Chard 
2004, 10)." 
Chard asked the question: "Can the social sciences tell us why the United 
States is the only Western democracy without government-provided health care 
(ibid, 4)?" He then discussed a cycle: The reciprocal relationship between 
knowledge and policy preferences. Each citizen bases his or her opinion of an 
issue on their own knowledge of the subject. The public's opinion can sway the 
elites as they formulate policy. Politicians rely on public opinion to craft their 
messages. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) wrote that such "[cjrafted talk has been 
more effective in opposing rather than promoting policy initiatives (xv)." Crafted 
talk is a persuasive message from political elites which attempts to move public 
opinion. 
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One glaring example of policy-makers moving in the opposite direction of 
public opinion occurred in 1998, when President Clinton was impeached, even 
though public opinion was clearly against such action. Jacobs and Shapiro wrote: 
The Republicans' unwavering decision to sail against public opinion 
and then to openly defend their undemocratic actions was just one 
aspect of the impeachment process that was atypical. Perhaps most 
surprising was that Republicans rebuffed public opinion on an extra-
ordinarily salient issue that put at risk their ambitions to expand con-
gressional majorities and capture the White House in the year 2000 
(Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, xii). 
That episode has parallels to the events of 2009-2010, when Democrats 
continued to push health care reform through, despite the wishes of the 
American people, even at the risk of being rebuffed at the ballot in 2010. 
In discussing dynamic policy change, Chard declared that path 
dependence is a way to explain why the United States still relies, for the most 
part, on the free market to supply health care to its citizens. Path dependence 
deals with customs, traditions, and history; decisions about policy are made by 
first examining the decisions of the past. Chard wrote that "the way in which each 
country promotes health is dictated by the political culture of the country" and "in 
the United States...minimal government has been viewed as the ideal...[thus] 
one would expect the governmental role in health care to also be minimal (2004, 
12)." Public opinion can also be thought of as being path dependent; however, it 
too can change with dynamic events. To break from tradition, to stray from the 
well-trod policy path, would require a dynamic rather than an incremental 
change. The two recent national health care proposals, in 1993-94 and 2009-
2010, were each large in scope, dramatic, and dynamic. 
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Chard (2004) explained that, regarding health care reforms, there are 
three crucial elements of politics in America: 1) the overall importance of health 
care; 2) the debate over whether health care is a public or private good; and 3) 
federal and state interventions in health care via Medicare and Medicaid as 
attempts to "change the mix of public and private provisions of health care... 
[and] to establish enduring institutions through which health care policy can be 
altered (ibid, 21)." Chard wrote that the nature of health care is dynamic and 
context dependent; that is, "determined by the ideology of the times and the 
citizens and elites involved (ibid)." 
The Ignorant Public 
Some scholars tend to minimize the effect of public opinion on policy. 
Bumstein wrote that "[t]he most common objection to the claim that public 
opinion influences public policy is that policy is really determined by interest 
organizations, political parties, and elites, particularly economic elites (2003, 29)." 
Burnstein made the argument that while some "still argue that democracy works 
much as it is supposed to, with public officials consistently responding to shifts in 
public opinion (ibid, 30)", the complexity of modern politics makes 
responsiveness problematic because "on many issues the public cannot be said 
to have meaningful political opinions, so policy must be the product of other 
forces (ibid)." 
In 1942, less than a decade after the advent of modern polling, Elmo 
Roper wrote that "the emphasis in public opinion research has been largely 
misplaced. I believe its first duty is to explore the areas of public ignorance 
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(Bishop 2005, 7)." The idea of the American public being ignorant regarding 
public policy has been broached by many scholars. Pierre Bourdieu criticized 
public opinion polling because it assumes "that everyone is politically and 
intellectually competent enough to interpret the questions the way pollsters and 
journalists do (ibid, 1)." 
Walter Lippmann believed that voters were largely ignorant about issues 
and policies. He wrote: 
In the absence of institutions and education by which the environ-
ment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life 
stand out sharply against self-centered opinion, the common 
interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be 
managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests 
reach beyond the locality (Lippmann 2010, 163)." 
The issue of health care may be an exception to Mr. Lippmann's theory, 
as it is national in scope, and not confined to particular localities. Also, it is a 
salient issue, for many Americans a life-and-death issue. Most Americans share 
a common interest in health care and health care costs. 
George Bishop (2005) described three problems in the asking of survey 
questions about public opinion, one of which was the widespread ignorance of 
the public regarding public affairs. There is some truth to that notion; however, 
the issue of health care reform is so salient that most people have a general 
understanding of it and some kind of opinion on it. Also, today the American 
public is more educated and better informed on the issues than in the past. Page 
and Shapiro (1983) wrote that "there has been a trend toward a better-educated 
citizenry and greater issue salience (182)." 
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It must be noted that in some cases where it appears that public opinion is 
influencing policy-makers, the opposite may be occurring. Erikson and Tedin 
(2007), wrote that "[i]n some instances when the electorate's preferences are 
statistically related to policy outcomes, it is conceivable that the true causal 
connection is reversed - that is, that politicians are educating the public rather 
than the public influencing the politicians (332)." This point was also taken up by 
Page and Shapiro (1983), when they wrote that congruence between opinion and 
policy might result from policy affecting opinion, instead of the other way around. 
This should be kept in mind as one studies the health care debate of 2009-2010. 
Consent of the Governed 
Now the discussion turns to the topic of policy-makers acting in the best 
interests of their constituents; that is, governing with the consent of the governed. 
It is the duty of policy-makers who are elected officials to at least be aware of the 
opinion of their constituents and to vote with those wishes in mind. Note that this 
paper deals strictly with national legislators, the President and members of 
Congress, many of whom do their own opinion-polling to gauge the opinions of 
their constituents. 
Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH) said that "Congress works for the next election -
it doesn't work for the next generation (2009)." Similarly, Andrew Smith (2010) 
stated that the main motivating factor of incumbent politicians is fear: Fear that 
they may lose their next election. This is especially evident in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, where elections take place every two years, as opposed to the 
Senate's six-year terms, as voters tend to have short memories. If a House 
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member votes yes on a bill, and public opinion polls show his or her constituents 
are strongly against the bill, that House member is risking losing the next 
election. 
This happened in the U.S. elections of 1994, just after President Clinton's 
failed efforts to reform health care, when Republicans had major wins, and took 
over control of the House and Senate. The "Harry and Louise" ads, to be 
discussed in Chapter Three, influenced public opinion on President Clinton's 
health care plan, which in turn affected both the 1994 and 1996 elections: 
Exposure to the Harry and Louise advertisements significantly 
decreased the likelihood of voting for Clinton in 1996. Further, 
these results point to a plausible explanation for the 1994 e-
lections in which the Democrats suffered the most stunning 
loss in their history, losing both houses of Congress by mar-
gins larger than any incumbent party in history, because of 
the lingering negative attitudes toward the Clinton administra-
tion (Chard 2004, 9). 
Regarding Mr. Smith's earlier-mentioned comment about fear as a 
motivating factor, one could argue that politicians up for election would tend to 
follow public opinion when voting, more than those who are not up for election. In 
the case of the 2009-2010 health care debate, a third of the Senate and all 
House members faced election in 2010, while it was mid-term for Mr. Obama. 
Yet health care reform was passed, a decision which was out of step with the 
opinion of the American public. 
One of the reasons why the national health care debate of 2009-2010 was 
such an anomaly was that many legislators, most of whom were up for election, 
did not vote for or against health care reform merely out of fear of losing the next 
election. For various reasons, there were examples of policy-makers falling on 
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their swords (or should one say scalpels?) by voting for health care reform 
knowing full well that it could cost them the next election. 
For example, on March 19, 2010, CBS news reported that "Democratic 
Rep. John Boccieri of Ohio acknowledged the political risk involved when he 
announced this morning he would vote in favor of the bill. Boccieri voted against 
the House bill last year. 'I'm not worried about the election,' he said at a press 
conference. 'I'm worried about doing what's right (Condon 2010)." On Nov. 2, 
2010, Boccieri lost his bid for re-election to Republican Jim Renacci. 
Masket and Greene 
Masket and Greene (2011) wrote a paper1 on the topic of the effect of 
individual roll-call votes on the reelection chances of members of Congress. They 
found that House Democrats who voted for health care reform were 6 to 8 
percentage points more likely not to be reelected in 2010. 
Figure 1 is a visual interpretation of the effects of the health care reform 
vote of March 21, 2010 in the House of Representatives. Note that the authors 
took into account the share of the Obama vote in each district. The authors claim 
that this graph may not look dramatic at first, "but you need to consider a vertical 
line running through the graph at whatever Obama vote percentage you find 
interesting. There's a huge amount of space between these lines on the y-axis 
representing likelihood of reelection (Masket 2011)." 
1
 The paper, titled "When One Vote Matters: The Electoral Impact of Roll Call Votes in the 2010 
Congressional Elections", may be found via a link in a blog entry by Seth Masket (2011). Internet address: 
http://enikrising.blogspot.com/2011/03/costliest-vote-revisited.html; clicking on the word "paper" in the 
first paragraph gives one access to the PDF version of the paper. 
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Masket and Greene found that the vote for health care reform was a costly 
one for House Democrats. They wrote: 
A Democratic member of the House who represents a district 
that gave 40 percent of its vote to Obama only had a 19 per-
cent likelihood of retaining her seat if she voted for health reform. 
That likelihood jumps to 54 percent if she opposed health re-
form. A Democrat representing a district that split 50-50 between 
Obama and McCain was likely to retain her seat, but that like-
lihood jumps from 70 percent to 92 percent if she switches from 
a yes vote to a no vote on health reform (Masket and Greene 
211, 11). 
Figure 1 Impact of Health Reform Vote on House Democrats' Likelihood 
of Reelection in 2010 
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Polarization 
The debate over national health care can be seen as a struggle between 
two opposing schools of economic thought: The laissez-faire and progressive 
traditions. The New York Times described this struggle thusly: 
Nearly every time this country has expanded its social safety net 
or tried to guarantee civil rights, passionate opposition has fol-
lowed. The opposition stems from the tension between two com-
peting traditions in the American economy. One is the laissez-faire 
tradition that celebrates individuality and risk-taking. The other is 
the progressive tradition that says people have a right to a minimum 
standard of living — time off from work, education and the like. Both 
traditions have been crucial to creating the most prosperous economy 
and the largest middle class the world has ever known. Laissez-faire 
conservatism has helped make the United States a nation of entre-
preneurs, while progressivism has helped make prosperity a mass-
market phenomenon (Leonhardt 2010). 
The struggle between the two economic traditions described above is an 
example of the great polarity regarding public opinion on many issues, and also 
the polarization of the Republican and Democratic parties; this leads to 
contentious arguments over issues such as health care, making compromise 
difficult. 
Let us now briefly examine the issue of polarization. In 1967 Assistant 
Secretary of State John McNaughton wrote about "the increased polarization that 
is taking place in the United States with seeds of the worst split in our people in 
more than a century (Sheehan 1971, xx)."2 At that time the war in Vietnam was 
among a number of polarizing issues which included abortion, gun control, 
separation of church and state, privacy, recreational drug use, homosexuality, 
and censorship issues (Hunter 1991). 
2
 This quote appeared in the forward to The Pentagon Papers (1971). 
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Blendon (2010) identified certain social and political trends as factors 
leading to polarization, namely: 1) wider income disparities between adherents of 
each party; 2) the re-segregation of housing by place, income and ethnicity; and 
3) the impact of the growth in the number of immigrants on the composition of the 
two parties. The Economist recently cited redistricting as a cause of political 
polarization when it wrote that: 
[Politically controlled redistricting helps drive the hyper-partisan-
ship of politics. In turbulent political times, when large swings in 
the vote are possible, party bosses feel driven to construct safer 
seats than they once used to need. With fewer seats changing 
hands on election day, this tends to shift the focus of politics 
away from the general election itself, and on to the primaries in 
which the parties select their candidates. The turnout in primaries 
is tiny, typically only between 10% and 20% of voters, and tends 
to be disproportionately composed of activists. So those selected 
tend to be politically slanted to the left or the right extremes 
(Time to bury Governor Gerry 2010, 20). 
Blendon (2010) wrote that "the political parties are divided on many 
major policy issues...[T]he polarization on issues has intensified in recent times 
(472)." Blendon and Benson (2010) wrote about partisan views on health care, 
noting that 45 percent of Republicans, and 13 percent of Democrats, felt it was 
up to individuals and not the government, to ensure that all people have health 
insurance. Also, regarding whether the government would do a worse or better 
job than private health insurance at providing overage, 60 percent of Republicans 
said worse, while 40 percent of Democrats said worse. Thirdly, regarding a 
national health insurance plan financed by taxes, 75 percent of Democrats 
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supported the idea, while only 27 percent of Republicans supported it3. Blendon 
and Benson wrote this about polarization: 
Taken together, public opinion data show a wide gap 
between Republicans and Democrats in their views about 
the future direction of U.S. health policy. Only a small part 
of this polarization of attitudes is likely to be attributable to 
differing health care experiences, but the differences be-
tween the two parties are substantial when it comes to wor-
ries about their health care and insurance in the future 
(Blendon and Benson 2010, 475). 
In 2009-2010, health care reform was a polarizing issue. Legislators and 
the public were about split down the middle on the issue, with strong opinions on 
both sides. The final House vote on the health care plan on March 21, 2010 was 
219-212 (51 percent for, 49 percent against), while public opinion on the health 
care bill was 47 percent for, 53 percent against. 
Polarizing issues can be referred to as "Moxie" issues. Moxie is a soft 
drink with a strong, distinct taste; people either love it or hate it - there is no in-
between. The health care reform debate of 2009-2010 involved many Moxie 
issues, among them abortion, government control of health care and stem cell 
research. Figure 2 is a chart which depicts Moxie issues, that is, polarizing health 
care issues. 
3
 These poll results are found in Chapter 20 of American Public Opinion and Health Care (2010), a text 
edited by Robert Blendon, Mollyann Brodie, John Benson, and Drew Altman. 
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Figure 2 Polarizing Health Care Issues of 2009-2010 
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The extreme polarization of opinion regarding health care reform efforts of 
2009-2010 was at times vitriolic in nature. For example, the tea party opposed 
President Obama's health care plan, and opponents mocked the group, calling 
its members "tea baggers", a term with a very vulgar connotation.4 
Both sides were crude: A racist anti-health care reform poster depicting 
President Obama as a witch doctor reflected anger and a very polarized 
viewpoint. 
4
 The definition of the vulgar slang term "tea bagger" may be found at the website Wikipedia ; internet 
address (warning: explicit content): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/tea_bag_(sexual_act) 
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The Polarized Congress of 2010 
On February 24, 2011 National Journal wrote that "Congress was more 
polarized last year than in any other year since National Journal began compiling 
its vote ratings. Overlap between the parties is disappearing (Brownstein 2011)." 
National Journal calculates liberal/conservative ratings of the U.S. 
Congress based on voting records, and found that in the Senate in 2010 "every 
Senate Democrat compiled a voting record more liberal than every Senate 
Republican - and every Senate Republican compiled a voting record more 
conservative than every Senate Democrat (ibid)." 
In the House, only five Republicans were rated more liberal than the most 
conservative Democrat (Gene Taylor D-MS), and only four Democrats were rated 
more conservative than the most liberal Republican (Joseph Cao R-LA). 
Brownstein wrote: 
The results document another leap forward in the fusion of 
ideology and partisanship that has remade Congress over the 
past three decades...[Increasingly, on the biggest issues, the 
parties line up in virtual lockstep against each other, as they did 
on many of the key measures in the 2010 rankings, such as the 
Senate votes on health care and financial services reform 
(Brownstein 2011). 
This phenomenon partly explains why health-care reform was passed 
despite public opinion against it: Democrats had control of Congress and stuck 
together, especially in the Senate, to get health care reform passed in 2010. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A MODEL OF PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY 
Description of the Model 
Figure 4, The Model of Public Opinion and Policy, which is presented at 
the end of this chapter, depicts various factors in flow chart form. At the top are 
listed the factors in the formation of public opinion (input); all this information is 
absorbed by the public, and opinions (output) are formed. These opinions are 
expressed by the public in a variety of types and forms. At the bottom of the 
Model are the policy-makers, who are influenced by the input of many factors, 
one of which is the public mood (public opinion). 
It must be noted that this Model depicts many variables, some of which 
have more influence or weight on public opinion and policy-making than others; 
this weight differs with each case study one encounters. Therefore, this thesis 
will not delve into the details of each and every variable in the Model. Instead, the 
Model is to be used as a guide, a framework for a discussion of the effect of 
public opinion and other factors on policy-makers. 
The model includes seven factors which influence the formation of public 
opinion at the individual level: 1) internalized values, which include parental and 
cultural values; 2) current events; 3) prior opinions; 4) demographics; 5) the 
media; 6) peer opinions; and 7) elite cues. Demographics involve the variables of 
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age, sex, income level, level of education, and so on, and "can be summarized in 
the keywords: culture, class, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, region, and age 
(Woshinsky1995, 129)." 
Another factor in public opinion formation, the media, was categorized by 
Rosenau (1961) into: 1) the personal media (face-to-face contact, by telephone -
including today, texting - and by mail); 2) the mass media (magazines, 
newspapers, radio and television news); and 3) organizational media (information 
intended for members of organizations, such as the NRA, or AARP). Note that 
the mass media factor includes interest group telephone, radio, and newspaper 
political ads, such as the "Harry and Louise" ads to be discussed later. Today we 
must also include the internet, by which much information is obtained via blogs, 
e-mails, on-line publications, and many other sources; some of these sources are 
reputable, and some are not. 
One example of misinformation on the internet regarding the health care 
bill involves a tax on home sales. After the bill was passed in March 2010, an e-
mail made the rounds of the internet; the item read, in part: "Check out this little 
surprise! I bet you never knew! Did you know that if you sell your house after 
2012 you will pay a 3.8% sales tax on it? It's in the healthcare bill." As usual with 
such postings, the reader was asked to forward the message "to every single 
person in your address book." 
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There was a tiny grain of truth in the message: the health care bill5 did 
include a 3.8 percent sales tax on the sale of homes, but only a small percentage 
of home sellers will pay the tax because 1) it covers only those with annual 
incomes over $200,000 (if filing jointly, $250,000); and 2) the tax won't apply to 
the first $250,000 on profits from the sale of a personal residence (if filing jointly, 
$500,000). 
Elite cues are an important source of information for the public and policy-
makers. Political elites try to influence the opinion of both the public and the 
policy-makers by use of cues, that is, political messages. The public relies on 
political elites to make sense of the political world, and take their cues from the 
elites. Cues can be regarded as signals aimed at shaping the opinion of the 
public and policy-makers. For example, in many of his speeches, 
announcements and interviews of 2009-2010, President Obama stressed the 
importance of passing health care reform immediately, such as when he stated in 
a speech of Sept. 10, 2009 that "Now is the season for action...now is the time to 
deliver on health care (Obama 2009a)." 
This great sense of urgency permeated the health care debates; it was a 
strong factor in itself in the eventual passing of the health care bill against the 
wishes of the American people. The sense of urgency was communicated by 
cues from political elites, especially President Obama, Speaker Pelosi and 
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. For example, on May 13, 2009, at a White 
House meeting with top Congressional Democrats, Mr. Obama said, regarding 
The home sales tax provision was included in H.R. 4872, "Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010", the reconciliation act that became part of the health care law. 
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health care reform: "We've got to get it done this year, both in the House and in 
the Senate. The stars are aligned (Bendavid 2009)." 
Included in the list of forms of expression of public opinion are: 1) polling 
data - from public opinion polls; 2) voting (the most powerful expression of public 
opinion); 3) letters to newspapers, internet blogs, calls to radio talk shows, etc.; 
4) attending policy-makers' "town hall meetings"; 5) letters, e-mails, and phone 
calls to policy-makers; and 6) speaking to peers. All but the last variable meld 
together to create what is known as "the public mood", which is one of the factors 
influencing policy-making. 
Incorporated into the model are eight factors in the formation of public 
policy: 1) the public mood: public opinion; 2) legislative committees; 3) the 
Constitution; 4) special interest groups and lobbyists; 5) ideology; 6) donors; 7) 
administrative agencies; and 8) elite cues. 
Kingdon (1989) argued that public opinion influences Congress, since 
"congressmen rely most heavily on colleagues within the House and on 
constituents for guidance as they vote, other actors in the system such as 
lobbyists and administration policy makers tend to work through these two 
gateway sources (240)." 
Theodore Lowi wrote about "interest group liberalism" and "the iron 
triangle." The former term involves determination of policy by interest groups. 
The latter is a behind-the-scenes subsystem, the three points of which are: 1) 
administrative agencies; 2) Congressional subcommittees; and 3) the private 
sector (individuals, corporations, and interest groups). Such a relationship "allows 
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one component of the subsystem to activate an effort toward common objectives 
with the full cooperation of the others (Milakovich and Gordon 2001, 91)." An 
example of an iron triangle would be the Department of Education, the House 
Subcommittee on Education Reform and the NEA (National Education 
Association). Such relationships are recognized by the inclusion of the three 
points of the iron triangle in the Model. 
Ideology is another factor in the making of both public opinion and policy. 
Malcolm Hamilton described ideology as "a system of collectively held normative 
and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular 
pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a 
particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, 
pursue or maintain (Carver 2002, 8)." 
Figure 3 is a diagram of the ideological spectrum, going from extreme left 
to right, that is liberal to conservative. Where one stands on this spectrum has an 
effect on one's political beliefs and one's opinion of issues. Ideology is a factor in 
the formation of policy by the policy-makers. 
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Figure 3 The Left-Right Spectrum: A Diagram for Understanding 
Political Positions in the Modern World 

















Also included in the Model as a factor in the making of policy is the U.S. 
Constitution, which dictates that "[t]he Senators and Representatives...shall be 
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support the Constitution (U.S. Constitution, Art. 
6)." Therefore, members of Congress, the policy-makers, are bound to support 
the Constitution, which means they are to follow its precepts while formulating 
policy. The Constitution, particularly its description of the specific enumerated 
and limited powers of each branch of the federal government, should be foremost 
in the minds of policy-makers; unfortunately, this is not always the case. 
One Congressman thought that every bill in Congress should state its 
Constitutional authority. Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ)6 had introduced a bill in 
every Congress since the 104th, called the "Enumerated Powers Act". The bill 
requires every Act of Congress to contain a statement explaining precisely the 
Mr. Shadegg retired in 2010, and did not run for reelection to a 9 term in the House of Representatives. 
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constitutional authority relied on for its enactment (Jones 2010). The bill has 
never advanced beyond the Judiciary subcommittee. 
However, it should be noted that on January 5, 2011 The Hill reported that 
the 112th Congress would begin with a public reading of the U.S. Constitution, 
and that a new provision "requires all proposed legislation to identify its 
constitutional antecedent (Hanna 2011)."7 
Looking at the Model, one must bear in mind that those groups which 
influence policy-makers (legislative committees, special interest groups, 
lobbyists, donors, administrative agencies, and elites) are also influenced by 
public mood/public opinion just as the policy-makers are directly. 
Although this thesis focuses primarily on the factors of public opinion, 
ideology, and elite cues in the case of health care reform, many factors which 
influenced both public opinion and public policy during the health care reform 
debate of 2009-2010 can be found in the Model of Public Opinion and Policy. For 
example, some factors in the formation of public opinion on health care reform 
include: 1) internalized values (whether one defines health care as a right or a 
privilege); 2) current events (the health care debate itself); 3) prior opinions on 
the topic; 4) demographics (one's education, race, income, etc.); 5) the media 
(information obtained from television and radio news and programs, newspapers, 
magazines, and various internet sources); 6) peer opinions; and 7) elite cues 
(political elites' crafted talk). 
7
 The new House rule reads: "A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced unless the sponsor has 
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record a statement citing as specifically as possible the power 
or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact the bill or joint legislation (Williams 2011)." 
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The factors in the formation of public health care policy, again taken from 
the Model, include: 1) public opinion (obtained from polling data, election results, 
letters to newspapers, internet blogs, calls to radio talk shows, letters, e-mails 
and phone calls to legislators, and attendance at policymakers' town meetings); 
2) legislative committees; 3) the Constitution (policymakers had differing opinions 
on the Constitutionality of some aspects of health care reform); 4) ideology 
(where one stands on the liberal-conservative spectrum); 5) donors (for example,-
the effect of a large contribution from an insurance company which favored the 
health care bill); 6) administrative agencies (the influence of agencies and 
programs to be affected by the health care bill, such as Medicare and the IRS); 
and 7) elite cues (pressure from political elites). 
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The Model 
Figure 4 A Model of Public Opinion and Policy 















EARLIER HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES 
Medicare 
Forty-five years before President Obama's health care bill was passed, 
another vast, expensive, and complex federal health initiative was passed, when 
it was included in the "Social Security Act Amendments" of 1965. It was 
Medicare, and it was established to provide health insurance for elderly 
Americans. Hamel (2010) wrote that at the time "nearly 40 percent of America's 
seniors were living at or below the poverty line, and roughly half of them lacked 
health insurance (152)." 
Two-thirds of the American public in 1964 supported Medicare; one factor 
in this support was thought to be public confidence in the Social Security system. 
Before the final vote for Medicare, the result of which is shown in Table 1, there 
was some debate over certain details of the plan. The American Medical 
Association was opposed to Medicare at first. However, the group was invited to 
make suggestions, and supported the final product. 
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Medicare is funded through a variety of sources: 1) general revenues, 40 
percent; 2) payroll taxes, 38 percent; 3) premiums collected from beneficiaries, 
12 percent; and 4) interest on the Medicare Trust Fund and other sources, 10 
percent. Medicare has grown tremendously over the years. Today, 12 percent of 
the federal budget is spent on Medicare; in 2010, $528 billion was spent on the 
program (Hamel 2010). 
Currently, the Medicare program is facing serious financing challenges8 
due to the aging of the population, increased health care costs, and a declining 
ratio of workers to beneficiaries. However, Medicare has always been popular 
with the public, which is reluctant to make cuts in the program to balance the 
budget. Table 2 is a tabulation of the results of a 2008 poll9 which asked: 
8
 In fact, the 2010 health care law includes a plan to cut the growth of Medicare with "delivery system 
reforms, reductions in payments to providers and MA [Medicare Advantage] plans, and the establishment 
of a new Independent Payment Advisory Board to recommend additional strategies to reduce spending 
(Hamel 2010,156)." 
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As you know, the federal government has a substantial budget 
deficit and there are many competing spending priorities facing 
the next president and Congress. Thinking about the federal 
budget, do you want to see the next president and Congress 
increase spending on Medicare (the program that provides health 
insurance primarily to people age 65 and older), decrease spend-
ing, or keep it about the same (Hamel 2010, 175)? 
Table 2 Opinions on Medicare Spending, by Party Identification, 
Ideology and Age 
Total 

















































Note: "Don't know" responses not shown (n= 1,628) 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Health, "The Public's 
Health Care Agenda for the New President and Congress," January 
2009 (conducted December 4-14, 2008). 
Medicare is an example of policy reflecting public opinion on a salient 
issue; of course there were many factors which influenced the policymakers in 
Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Health poll conducted December 4-14, 2008 of 1,628 adults 
aged 18 and over, with a margin of error of ±3%. 
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this case, such as special interests (i.e. the AMA), elite cues, and administrative 
agencies (i.e. the Social Security Administration), but public opinion certainly 
seems to have also played a role. 
Clinton's Plan 
West wrote that "the unraveling of the Clinton Health care package in 
1993 and 1994 is one of the most dramatic stories of recent public policy (West 
1996, 35)." West argued that "interest groups, and the attendant advertisements 
and news coverage that emanated from interest group activities, were 
instrumental in creating negative perceptions of the president's program in the 
public (ibid, 36)." 
The story began on Sept. 22, 1993, when President Clinton announced 
his health care reform ideas in a televised address to Congress. The 1,364-page 
plan was called the American Health Security Act. 
The scale of the proposal was stunning. It included a basic 
benefits package covering prescription drugs, rehabilitation 
services, mental health and substance abuse treatment, 
hospice, home health and extended nursing care services, 
and abortion services. Under the plan, almost every aspect 
of the health care system would change (West 1996, 41). 
There was a lot of media attention given to the plan, followed by a wave of 
interest-group spending, the biggest share of which went to political advertising. 
Harry and Louise 
The prime example of interest-group efforts to sway public opinion during 
the 1993-94 national health care debate was the "Harry and Louise" ad 
campaign. Harry and Louise were a fictional married couple featured in a series 
of ads on radio and television, and in print, from September 1993 to September 
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1994. The ads were sponsored by the Health Insurance Association of America 
(HIAA), and were developed through the use of focus groups and public opinion 
surveys. It was thought that since "[t]he kitchen table is the symbol for family 
decisions (West 1996, 48)", the first ad should feature Harry and Louise 
discussing health care at the kitchen table. 
The "Harry and Louise" television ads were said to look more like 
commercials than political ads. The following is the original script from one of the 
earlier "Harry and Louise" ads; it demonstrates the flavor of all the ads. 
Harry: I'm glad the President's doing something about health care reform. 
Louise: He's right. We need it. 
Harry: Some of these details. 
Louise: Like a national limit on health care? 
Harry: Really. 
Louise: The Government caps how much the country can spend on health 
care and says "That's it!" 
Harry: So, what if our health plan runs out of money? 
Political advertising, such as the "Harry and Louise" ads, allows control of 
both content and timing. In an attempt to influence citizens at the grassroots 
level, such ads have three audiences: 1) the public; 2) media reporters; and 3) 
Washington officials. Each audience group in the triad can be affected differently 
by the same ad. The "Harry and Louise" ads were shown on television in 
targeted areas of the country; however, the media coverage was great, and 
television news programs repeated the ads, thus creating a much larger 
audience. West noted that the health care arena differs from other topics, such 
as trade, due to the enormous financial impact (which leads to more spending by 
interest groups) and an extraordinary amount of news coverage. 
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West (1996) wrote that "key members of Congress, and White House 
officials took the 'Harry and Louise' commercials seriously and believed these 
ads were decisive in changing the national political debate on health care (ibid, 
60)." In fact, on Nov. 1, 1993, Hillary Clinton lashed out at the health insurance 
industry for airing the ads, saying, "They have the gall to run TV ads that there is 
a better way, the very industry that has brought us to the brink of bankruptcy 
because of the way that they have financed health care (ibid, 49)." 
West wrote that "[t]he movement against the Clinton health reform effort 
was one of the most successful policy advertising campaigns in American history 
(1996, 63)". The health care plan never even came up to a full vote on the floor of 
the House or Senate. West's research suggested that 1) generous financial 
resources make a difference in lobbying (HIAA spent $20 million); 2) elites can 
be persuaded that the public does not approve of a particular proposal by the use 
of "outside" strategy (mobilizing the public), as opposed to "inside" strategy 
(direct lobbying); and 3) "the health care experience was idiosyncratic because of 
the particular way advertisements were reported...there was little effective 
oversight in the health care debate (West 1996, 65)." 
West was concerned that the use of ads such as "Harry and Louise" by 
interest groups in complex policy debates would present a danger to 
representative democracy. He wrote: "Assuming reporters learn from their past 
mistakes, the next policy battle should feature more detailed oversight by the 
mass media". This warning is similar to that given by Page and Shapiro (1983) 
and quoted on page eight of this paper: That there exists the danger that interest 
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groups might manipulate public opinion using deception, and that public policy 
might then be formulated based on that public opinion. 
Incrementalism 
Richard Chard (2004) described two schools of thought regarding policy 
change: dynamic policy change and incrementalism. A policy with large public 
support might be enacted all at once, while a policy with little public support may 
be advanced in small parts. Although President Clinton failed in his attempt to 
drastically change America's health care system in one fell swoop, some of his 
ideas did eventually come to pass. Three examples are: 1) the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA); 2) the Medicare Prescription, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003; and 3) the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) of 2007, now called CHIP. 
In November 2009, former President Clinton spoke to Senate Democrats, 
urging them to learn from his 1993-94 mistakes and pass healthcare reform. 
Wrote The Hill: 
After Clinton's healthcare plan crashed and burned, Republicans 
took control of the House and Senate in the 1994 elections. While 
Clinton was able to recover and secure a second term, his window 
of opportunity for passing comprehensive healthcare reform had 
been slammed shut. Democrats said Clinton was frank about his 
missteps during the 1993 healthcare debate, telling them he regret-
ted not adequately explaining to the public the impact of Senate 
filibusters and the need for reform. Clinton called on Democrats to 
be ready to compromise, something his administration was criti-
cized for not doing in 1993 and 1994...Clinton also told Democrats 
they could benefit from one key difference between 1993 and 2009, 
senators said: Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) 
wants a bill a lot more than former Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
(D-N.Y.) did. Clinton's healthcare bill never made it to the Senate floor 
(Rushing 2009). 
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What Went Wrong? 
At this point it may be helpful to consider why President Clinton's health 
care reform efforts failed, in light of the recent success of President Obama's 
health care reform efforts. Writing in The New England Journal of Medicine, 
Oberlander wrote: 
Perhaps the Clinton administration's greatest mistake was ex-
cessive ambition. The plan attempted simultaneously to secure 
universal coverage, regulate the private insurance market, 
change health care financing through an employer mandate, 
control costs to levels enforced by a national health board, and 
transform the delivery system through managed care. Any one 
of these goals alone would have been difficult to achieve...[E]ach 
dimension of the Clinton plan galvanized opposition...The Clinton 
administration both underestimated the opposition and overes-
timated the support for reform. The administration failed to mo-
bilize any organized constituency to counter the attacks, and 
groups they counted on as allies, such as big business, disap-
pointed them. Congressional Democrats were divided, and, rather 
than endorsing Clinton's plan, pushed their own favored solutions 
(Oberlander 2007). 
Regarding Mr. Clintons 1993-94 health reform efforts, Derek Bok (1998) 
wrote that "[t]o carry a legislative campaign of this magnitude, effective 
Presidential leadership was clearly essential." President Clinton's performance 
can be criticized on several grounds: 1) He attempted to do too much too soon in 
view of his weak popular mandate (43 percent of the popular vote in 1992); 2) he 
used a task force headed by his wife, that operated in secret; and 3) he did little 
to explain the plan to the people once it was introduced (ibid). 
Comparison to 2009-2010 
One might ask: Why did health care reform pass in 2010, and not in 1994? 
The Congress of each era was Democratic to a similar degree: The legislative 
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and executive branches were controlled by Democrats in both cases. The 
ideologies of the 103rd and 111th Congresses were similar: the Senate of 1994 
had an average liberal composite score of 49.910, and the Senate of 2010 had an 
average liberal composite score of 56.6. However, just that 6.7 point difference in 
liberal scores could affect the outcome of some votes. 
There was, however, a certain lack of passion in the political elites' fight 
for health care reform in 1993-94. This was reflected in former President 
Clinton's remarks to Senate Democrats in November 2009, when he noted that 
Finance Committee Chairmen Max Baucus (D-MO) wanted a health care reform 
bill a lot more than former Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) did 
(Rushing 2009). 
The Democratic leaders had been banned from the early planning process 
of Mr. Clinton's health care plan, and thus were not as supportive as were the 
Democrats of 2009-2010 of Mr. Obama's health care plan, which they helped to 
develop. There was not quite the sense of extreme urgency in the 1993-94 
efforts as there was in 2009-2010. 
After studying President Clinton's 1993-94 health care reform efforts, we 
can see that the media played a role in shaping public opinion against Mr. 
Clinton's attempts at health care reform; in particular, the "Harry and Louise" ads 
were successfully employed by special interests. Public opinion, in turn, was a 
major variable in the formation of public policy in that case. We shall see in the 
narrative of President Obama's 2009-2010 health care reform efforts, to be 
The National Journal voter ratings scores are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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presented in Chapter Four, that the major forces which influenced public policy in 
that case were ideology and elite cues, as well as the extreme sense of urgency 
which permeated the debate. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A NARRATIVE OF THE 2009-2010 
HEALTH CARE DEBATE 
Mr. Obama 
Darrell West wrote that "[a]fter decades of piecemeal reform in America, a 
newly elected president made universal health care coverage the centerpiece of 
his domestic agenda, only to see his effort fail decisively (West 1996, 35)." Those 
words were written about President Clinton, and this, too, could have become the 
story of President Obama's efforts at health care reform. However, Mr. Obama 
was eventually successful, even though public opinion opposed his efforts. Now 
follows a brief history of the health care reform efforts of 2009-2010, focusing on 
elite cues, ideology and public opinion, and the role they play in policy-making. 
President Barack Obama, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, and 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi were the three major Democratic political 
actors in the health care reform efforts of 2009-2010. The actions and words of 
these three elites are notable, as they each tried to shape public opinion with 
crafted talk. 
The President of the United States, having been elected by the people of 
all the states, is in a unique position to influence public opinion by the use of what 
Teddy Roosevelt called "the bully pulpit". The only real power of the president is 
the "power to persuade...to manipulate each of his own constituencies (Lowi 
1985,9)." 
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The President tries to persuade the American people in a variety of 
arenas, including 1) press conferences; 2) interviews; 3) signing statements 
(comments made when signing bills); 4) testing trial balloons11; and 5) speeches, 
especially nationally televised speeches such as the State of the Union speech. 
One important speech regarding health care reform was given by 
President Obama to Congress on September 10, 2009, during the middle innings 
of the great ball game that was the health care debate. Presented below is an 
excerpt from that televised speech; in it, Mr. Obama framed the issue of health 
care reform as he saw it, discussed the main points of his plan, and answered 
specific complaints of critics, in his attempt to influence Congress and the public. 
In the speech before Congress and the country, Mr. Obama said: 
The plan I'm announcing tonight would meet three basic goals: 
it will provide more security and stability to those who have health 
insurance. It will provide insurance to those who don't. And it will 
slow the growth of healthcare costs...[UJnder this plan, individuals 
will be required to carry basic health insurance...[Gjiven all the mis-
information that's been spread over the past few months, I realize 
that many Americans have grown nervous about reform...The best 
example is the claim...that we plan to set up panels of bureaucrats 
with the power to kill off senior citizens...It is a lie...There are also 
those who claim that our reform effort will insure illegal immigrants. 
This, too, is false...My health care proposal has also been attacked 
by some who oppose reform as a "government takeover" of the entire 
health care system...I have no interest in putting insurance companies 
out of business...Finally, let me discuss an issue that is a great concern 
to me...and that is how we pay for this plan...I will not sign a plan that 
adds one dime to our deficits - either now or in the future don't pay 
attention to scary stories about how your benefits will be cut...the plan 
I'm proposing will cost around $900 billion over ten years...I will not 
accept the status quo as a solution. Not this time...I understand that 
11
 Safire (1968, 454) defined trial balloons as: "A testing of public reaction of an idea through another 
person, causing no embarrassment to the author if the reaction is not good." Regarding the derivation of 
the phrase, Safire wrote that "a trial balloon is a balloon put up to test the direction and velocity of the 
wind in balloon ascensions and kite-flying contests (ibid)." 
42 
the politically safe move would be to kick the can further down the 
road - to defer reform one more year, or one more election, or one 
more term. But that's not what the moment calls for...We did not 
come to fear the future. We came here to shape it (Obama 2009a). 
A great sense of urgency permeated Mr. Obama's speech. He referred to 
health care reform as an issue to be dealt with now, and not to be kicked down 
the road to be dealt with later. The speech brought up some of the major 
criticisms of the health plan and tried to deflect them. Concerns specifically 
mentioned were: 1) death panels; 2) insurance of illegal aliens; 3) government 
takeover of the entire health system; 4) adding to the public deficit; and 5) cuts in 
benefits for seniors. Mr. Obama's speech was a series of elite cues to the public 
and the policy-makers in an effort to shape opinion. 
A Work in Progress 
Initially, President Obama chose not to go the route of President Clinton, 
and instead of crafting the details of health reform himself, turned the job over to 
Congressional Democrats. During the health care debates of 2009-2010, 
legislation was a work in progress, and both the Senate and House versions of 
the health care bill were long and complicated. 
At times even the policy-makers were overwhelmed. For example, on July 
27, 2009 House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers (D-MI) questioned 
the point of lawmakers reading the health care bill when he said: "I love these 
members that get up and say 'Read the bill!' What good is reading the bill if it's a 
thousand pages and you don't have two days and two lawyers to find out what it 
means after you've read the bill (Conyers 2009)?" On March 8, 2010, while 
speaking at a Legislative Conference for the National Association of Counties, 
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Speaker Pelosi (D-CA) said: "We have to pass the [health care reform] bill so that 
you can find out what is in it (Roff 2010)." These comments bring to mind the 
words of James Madison in Federalist 62: "It will be of little avail to the people 
that the laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous 
that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood 
(Madison etal 1999,349)." 
Job Approval Ratings 
During the health care debate of 2009-2010, public opinion poll results 
indicated an increase in the disapproval ratings of both President Obama and 
Congress, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figure 5 President Obama's Approval Rating Feb. 2009 to April 2010 
Source: CBS News 
CBS News reported on April 2, 2010 that "President Obama's overall job 
approval rating has fallen to an all-time low of 44 percent, down five points from 
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late March, just before the health bill's passage in the House of Representatives. 
It's down 24 points since his all-time high last April (CBS News 2010)." The 
complete results of the April 1, 2010 CBS Poll regarding Mr. Obama's job 
approval were: 44 percent approve, 41 percent disaprove, and 15 percent don't 
know (ibid). 
On March 4-7, 2010, Gallup asked the question: "Do you approve or 
disaprove of the way Congress is handling its job?" The results were: Approve, 
16 percent; disapprove, 80 percent; and unsure 4 percent.12 Figure 6 is a 
longitudinal depiction of the ratings, from March 2009 to March 2010. 
Figure 6 Public Approval/disapproval of Congress May 2009 to March 2010 
Source: www.pollingreport.com 
12
 Gallup Poll March 4-7, 2010. N=l,014 adults nationwide, Margin of error +4% (www.pollingresults.com) 
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The Premise: Health Care as a Right 
The reasons why public opinion was against President Obama's health 
care reform proposal can be divided into three categories: The premise, the 
product, and the process. The premise of health care reform is that health care is 
a right. Chard (2004) wrote that "[t]he idea that health care is a right derives from 
collectivist societies; that is, societies that believe that each person needs to 
contribute to society and that in order to contribute a person must be healthy 
(12)." 
Some cite the Constitution's General Welfare clause as inferring 
responsibility on the federal government to provide health care to its citizens. The 
clause states that "[t]he Congress shall have power...to provide for the...General 
Welfare of the United States (U.S. Constitution, Art.1, sec. 8)." 
Others argue that the General Welfare clause does not infer such 
responsibilty; that it is an introduction to the enumerated powers of Congress that 
follow and is not itself a grant of power. Those enumerated powers include the 
powers to: 1) lay and collect taxes; 2) borrow and coin money; 3) establish post 
offices;and 4) declare war and support armies. The limits of the General Welfare 
clause were defined by James Madison in 1792 when he wrote to Henry Lee 
these words: 
If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done 
by money, and will promote the General Welfare, the Gov-
ernment is no longer a limited one, possessing enumerated 
powers, but an indefinite one, subject to particular exceptions 
(Brant 1970, 6). 
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Walter Williams (2010) wrote that "[fjor Congress to guarantee a right to 
health care...whether a person can afford it or not, it must diminish someone 
else's rights, namely their rights to their earnings." 
On the other side of the issue is the opinion of those such as Sen. Bernie 
Sanders (l-VT), who wrote: "[A]ll of us should have health care coverage, and... 
nobody should be left out of the system...[W]e must end the private insurance 
company domination of the health care in our country (2009)." 
The Product 
As mentioned previously, President Obama discussed five criticisms of 
health care reform in his speech of September 10, 2009, namely 1) death panels; 
2) insurance of illegal aliens; 3) government takeover of the entire health system; 
4) adding to the public deficit; and 5) cuts in benefits for seniors. Other items for 
criticism include: 6) federal funding for abortions; 7) the public option; and 8) the 
individual mandate. These criticisms fall into the category of product; the term 
"product" referring to the health care bill itself, and forms of health care legislation 
while the work was in progress. Here we shall consider five items from the above 
list. 
Death Panels 
The idea of "death panels" included in health care legislation was first 
brought up by Sarah Palin on her internet Facebook page on August 7, 2009, 
when she wrote: 
[Government health care will not reduce the cost; it will simply 
refuse to pay the cost. And who will suffer the most when they 
ration care? The sick, the elderly, and the disabled, of course. 
The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or 
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my baby with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of 
Obama's "death panel" so his bureaucrats can decide, based 
on a subjective judgment of their "level of productivity in society", 
whether they are worthy of health care. Such a system is 
downright evil (Palin 2009). 
A few days later, while speaking at a town hall style meeting in 
Portsmouth, NH, President Obama stated that he did not want to set up 
government death panels. Referring to the rumor, he said: "I guess this arose out 
of a provision in one of the House bills that allowed Medicare to reimburse 
people for consultations about end-of-life care, setting up living wills. Somehow 
it's gotten spun into this idea of death panels (Parsons 2009)." 
Charles Krauthammer called the provision an outrage, though not a 
setting up of death panels, when he wrote: 
[l]t is subtle pressure applied by society through your doctor. 
And when you include it in a health-care reform whose major 
objective is to bend the cost curve downward, you have to 
be a fool or a knave to deny that it's intended to gently point 
the patient in a certain direction, toward the corner of the 
sickroom where stands a ghostly figure, scythe in hand, offer-
ing release (Krauthammer 2010). 
Due to the political storm over "death panels", the end-of-life planning 
provision was dropped from the health care bill. However, The New York Times 
reported in late December 2010 that the Obama administration would achieve 
the same goal by a Medicare regulation set to take effect January 1, 2011. The 
rule was issued by Medicare administrator Dr. Donald Berwick, who has said that 
"[u]sing unwanted procedures in terminal illness is a form of assault. In economic 
terms, it is a waste (Pear 2010)." 
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Then, on January 4, 2011, the new Medicare regulation regarding end-of-
life planning was suddenly dropped. The New York Times wrote: "The renewed 
debate over advance care planning threatened to become a distraction to 
administration officials who were gearing up to defend the health law against 
attack by the new Republican majority in the House (Pear 2011)." 
Insurance for Illegal Aliens 
President Obama, during his September 10, 2009 televised address to 
Congress on health care, denied the claim that the health care plan would insure 
illegal immigrants, at which point Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) shouted out: "You lie!" 
The fact is, the bills before Congress at that time all declared illegal immigrants to 
be ineligible for subsidized benefits. 
However, one early version of health care reform, H.R. 3200, included a 
provision to make health insurance cheaper for lower income families; it did not 
specify citizenship. In August 2009, this quote by the Congressional Research 
Service regarding H.R. 3200 was widely circulated on the internet: 
Under H.R. 3200, a "Health Insurance Exchange" would begin 
operation in 2013 and would offer private plans alongside a 
public option...H.R. 3200 does not contain any restrictions on 
noncitizens—whether legally or illegally present, or in the 
United States temporarily or permanently—participating in the 
Exchange (Tapscott 2009). 
It must be stressed that H.R. 3200 was never passed, and the health care 
bill signed into law on March 23, 2010 did not include health insurance for illegal 
immigrants. However, many comments, blogs, and opinion pieces which refer to 
H.R. 3200 continued to circulate on the internet; this tended to confuse some 
individuals regarding the new health care law. 
49 
As depicted in the Model of Public Opinion and Policy, the public receives 
its information in many ways, including from such media sources as 24/7 
television news, radio talk shows, and internet blogs. During the health care 
reform debate of 2009-2010, some issues were misunderstood, misconstrued, 
and miscommunicated. The confusion surrounding the issue of health insurance 
for illegal immigrants is an example of such misinformation affecting public 
opinion. 
The Public Option 
Another product issue was the "public option", which was originally the 
backbone of health care reform, but which was not included in the final 
legislation. If enacted, the public option would have been an extension of the 
Medicare/Medicaid system. A government-run health insurance program, it would 
have provided a low cost alternative to private health insurance plans. 
President Obama strongly supported the idea of the public option during 
the 2008 presidential campaign and after taking office. On September 7, 2009, 
days before his televised address to Congress on the issue of health care, Mr. 
Obama said: "I continue to believe that a public option within that basket of 
insurance choices will help (Sundby 2009)." 
The public option was included in early House bills, but not in legislation 
proposed by the Senate. President Obama floated a trial balloon in February 
2010 when Health and Human Services Sec. Kathleen Sebelius stated: "The 
President said from the outset he thought that [the public option] was a great way 
to provide cost reduction and competition moving forward, but if that is not the 
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choice of the majority moving forward, I think there are other ways to get there 
(Grim 2010)". 
Often political elites employ crafted talk spoken through the mouths of 
others to gauge opinion. In this case President Obama was concerned with both 
the opinion of Congress, in an effort to pass the bill quickly, and public opinion, 
which had turned against the idea of a public option. Mr. Obama came to realize 
that his health care reform package would have a better chance of passage if the 
public option idea was dropped, so in a major compromise move, he did so; the 
public option was not included in the final health care bill. 
The Abortion Issue 
SteelFisher (2010) wrote that "legalized abortion13 is one of the most 
politicized and polarized health issues of our time (264)." Table 314 shows how 
Americans described themselves on the issue from 1996 to 2010. 
13
 In the field of medicine, the word "abortion" refers to both a miscarriage and intentional termination of 
a pregnancy. In this paper, the word is used in the political context, referring only to the intentional 
termination of a pregnancy. 
14
 Table 3 is from the text American Public Opinion and Health Care (Blendon 2011) and the sources for 
the data are: Gallup polls (Storrs, Conn.: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, July 26-28,1996; May 
6-9, 2002; October 14-16, 2004; May 8-11, 2006; June 11-14, 2007, May 8-11, 2008). Gallup/CNN/US4 
Today polls (Storrs, Conn.: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, November 6-9,1997; January 16-18, 
1998; April 30-May 2,1999; July 14-16, 2000; August 10-12, 2001; October 24-26, 2003; July 22-24, 2005; 
July 17-19, 2009). Gallup/US-A Today poll (Storrs, Conn.: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, March 
26-28, 2010). 
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Table 3 Pro-Choice or Pro-Life: Americans Describe Themselves, 1996-2010 
(in percent) 





























































Note: "Don't know" responses not shown. 
Question: With respect to the abortion issue, would you consider yourself 
pro-choice or pro-life? 
Source: SteelFisher2010, 284. 
Three Supreme Court rulings have defined the history of abortion in the 
United States: 1) Roe v. Wade (1973), which legalized abortion at the federal 
level, calling a woman's option to choose an abortion a right to privacy; 2) 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), which held 
that spousal notification placed an undue burden, or obstacle, in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion, but certain other requirements15 did not; and 3) 
This case "allowed states to pass additional restrictions on abortion, such as a 24- hour waiting period, 
informed consent, and consent with a judicial waiver (SteelFisher 2010, 265)." 
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Gonzalez v. Carhart (2003), which upheld a law banning partial-birth abortions, a 
specific late-term procedure (SteelFisher 2010). 
The U.S. government funds few abortions, in part due to the Hyde 
Amendment (1976), which bans federal Medicaid funds from paying for 
abortions, except in cases of rape or incest, or when the mother's life is in 
danger. The 2010 health care law has a provision that provides funds for 
community health centers (CHCs), which provide subsidized medical care to low 
income Americans; this care includes abortions. Since the Hyde Amendment 
does not cover CHCs, action had to be taken to pacify pro-life Democrats and 
obtain their support for the bill. 
During the health care debate, a group of moderate pro-life Democratic 
legislators known as "blue dogs"16 were against the health care bill. On 
November 7, 2009, just before voting on a version of the health care bill (H.R. 
3962), the House voted on the Stupak-Pitts Amendment. The amendment 
prohibited any government-run insurance plans from paying for abortions or the 
costs of any health plan that covers abortion, except in cases of rape, incest or 
danger to the life of the mother (similar to the Hyde Amendment). The House 
passed the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, then immediately voted on the health care 
bill, passing it by a vote of 220-215. 
However, the Senate version of the health care bill, which was passed on 
Dec. 24, 2009, did not include the language of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, and 
16
 The term "blue dog Democrat" refers to Democrats who have been "choked blue" by extremely liberal 
Democrats; blue dogs are conservative on social and economic issues. The term is related to "yellow dog 
Democrat", a reference to Southern Democrats so loyal that they would vote for a yellow dog, if it were a 
Democrat. 
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it was a version of that Senate bill that the House was to vote on in March 2010. 
In an attempt to retain the vote of pro-life Democratic House members, President 
Obama signed Executive Order 13535 on March 21, 2010, which committed the 
Hyde Amendment's policies into the context of the health care bill. That day, the 
House passed the health care bill by a vote of 219-212. 
The Individual Mandate 
In October 2009, when asked where the Constitution authorized Congress 
to order Americans to buy health insurance, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 
replied: "Are you serious? Are you serious (Cover 2009)?" The questioning of the 
constitutionality of any legislation is very serious, indeed. 
The individual mandate was perhaps the most contentious issue of the 
2009-2010 health care debate, and it is the very heart of the health care bill. The 
individual mandate requires that all Americans must buy health insurance or face 
a monetary fine. This issue came up during the 1993-4 health care debate, when 
the Congressional Budget office determined that the individual mandate provision 
was an unprecedented act, stating: 
The government has never required people to buy any good 
or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United 
States. An individual mandate would have two features that, 
in combination, would make it unique. First, it would impose 
a duty on individuals as members of society. Second, it would 
require people to purchase a specific service that would be 
heavily regulated by the federal government (CNS News 2010). 
Of course, just because a mandate is unique doesn't necessarily make it 
unconstitutional. 
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Barack Obama was against the idea of the individual mandate during the 
2008 presidential campaign, but had a change of heart in July 2009, saying, "I've 
been persuaded that there are enough young, uninsured people who are cheap 
to cover, but are opting out. To make sure that those folks are part of the overall 
pool is the best way to make sure that all of our premiums go down (Connelly, 
2009, 1)." 
The main argument regarding the individual mandate concerns its 
constitutionality. The Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power to lay 
and collect Taxes...[and] to regulate Commerce...among the several 
States...(U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8). 
Those who believe that the individual mandate is constitutional argue that 
1) it is a regulation of interstate commerce, as the costs incurred when 
individuals choose to be uninsured affect commerce; and 2) the mandate is 
structured as a tax, giving individuals the choice to pay the tax or purchase 
health insurance. 
Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), believes that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional. He wrote: 
Every commerce clause case ever decided by the Supreme 
Court...has involved an activity in which individuals chose to 
engage. The Obamacare insurance mandate is not in this 
category at all. Rather than regulating activity in which indi-
viduals choose to engage, Obamacare regulates the decision 
itself (Hatch 2010). 
Rivkin and Casey (2009) argue that constitutionally, Congress cannot 
require every American to buy health insurance because "the federal government 
does not have the power to regulate Americans simply because they are there." 
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They point out that the commerce clause is not infinitely elastic, and the 
enumerated powers given to Congress deny it the type of general police power 
that is freely exercised by the states. 
Rivkin and Casey cite two cases, United States v. Lopez (1995)17 and 
United States v. Morrison (2000)18, in which the Supreme Court rejected the idea 
that the commerce clause allows Congress to regulate non-economic activities 
"merely because, through a chain of causal effects, they might have an economic 
impact (ibid)." 
During the 2009-2010 health care debate, in his efforts to get the health 
care reform bill passed, President Obama insisted that the fine to be incurred on 
individuals who failed to purchase health insurance was a penalty, not a tax. On 
September 27, 2009, during an interview on ABC News, when told the fee was a 
tax, Mr. Obama replied: "No...for us to say that you've got to take responsibility 
to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax increase...this levy - don't call it a 
tax - is for your own good (Obama's nontax tax 2009)." 
However, when states began to question the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate, the Obama administration insisted that the fee was indeed a 
tax, and covered under the constitutional clause giving the federal government 
the power to lay and collect taxes. In June 2010, in a brief defending the law, the 
Justice Department said the requirement for people to carry insurance or pay the 
17
 In this case, the Supreme Court found the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act to be unconstitutional, 
because the possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity covered by the 
commerce clause. 
18
 In this case, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not have the authority to enact the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, since the statute did not regulate an activity that affected interstate 
commerce. 
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penalty is "a valid exercise of Congress's power to impose taxes (Clouthier 
2010)." 
The week the health care bill was passed, in late March 2010, a 
Rasmussen Reports poll19 indicated that 49 percent of those polled supported 
state lawsuits against the health care plan. The efforts by states to fight the 
health care plan after it became law are described in Chapter Five of this paper. 
The Process 
Another reason public opinion was against the health care bill was the 
process, which refers to how legislation is made. In some cases, pork is added to 
a bill for votes, and deals are made with, or threats are made to, legislators. 
German chancellor Otto von Bismarck20 (1815-1898) is credited with the 
comment: "There are two things you don't want to see being made - sausage 
and legislation." The legislative process regarding health care reform in 2009-
2010 was a messy one, which gave new meaning to the phrase "the end justifies 
the means." 
During the health care debate of 2009-2010, certain process events took 
place which the public found distasteful, among them: 1) the Cornhusker 
Kickback; 2) the Louisiana Purchase; 3) the union deal 4) the exit of Rep. Massa; 
5) the plane ride; 6) the deem and pass threat; and 7) the reconciliation 
maneuver. 
19




 It is interesting to note that it was Bismarck, who, in 1883, "introduced a health-insurance law that 
required both companies and workers to contribute to the costs of care (Clear diagnosis 2010,47)." 
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The Cornhusker Kickback 
The so-called "Cornhusker Kickback" involved obtaining the vote of Sen. 
Ben Nelson (D-NE) for the health care reform bill in late 2009. On January 16, 
2010, The Economistwrote: 
When every vote counts, lawmakers who fail to bring a fat wedge 
of pork home to their district are in danger of looking like wimps. 
Most blatantly, Ben Nelson, a Democrat from Nebraska, withheld 
his support for the health bill long enough to force Harry Reid, the 
Senate majority leader, to promise that Nebraska alone would not 
have to bear any of the cost of future expansion of the Medicaid 
programme. Mr. Reid dismissed the ensuing furore. "That's what 
legislating is all about," he said. "It's compromise." It may be no 
coincidence that two out of three Americans tell pollsters they 
disapprove of the way Congress does its job (It hasn't 
been pretty 2010). 
The Louisiana Purchase 
The "Louisiana Purchase" refers to another deal made by Sen. Reid for 
support of the health care bill; this time with Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-LA). Just 
before a Senate vote on the bill, additional Medicaid funding for Landrieu's state, 
originally believed to be $100 million, was added to the bill. The deal was dubbed 
the "Louisiana Purchase." 
Regarding the Landrieu deal, The /-//'//editor A.B. Stoddard wrote: "No one 
wants to know how sausage is made, for this very reason (2009)." What irritated 
the public even more, adding salt to the wound, was this comment made by Sen. 
Landrieu days after the deal was made: "I am not going to be defensive. And it's 
not a $100 million fix. It's a $300 million fix (Milbank 2009)." 
It should be noted that the "Cornhusker Kickback" and "Louisiana 
Purchase" were not included in the final bill signed into law by President Obama 
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on March 23, 2010. Strong public opinion against the two deals played a major 
role in their demise. This is an example of the mediating effect of public opinion: 
While public opinion failed to stop health care reform as a whole from passing, it 
did have an effect on the some aspects of the bill. 
The Union Deal 
On Jan. 14, 2010, a closed-door meeting was held at the White House 
between President Obama and a number of national union officials. In exchange 
for their support of the health care bill, the unions won exemption from a 40 
percent excise tax on high-cost "Cadillac"21 health insurance plans. Dubay wrote: 
This most likely means a further increase of the payroll tax... 
The backroom deal...is a bad idea for any taxpayer that is not 
in a union. And not only will union members not have to pay the 
tax, but unions will get an extra benefit because they will have 
a new selling point to pitch to potential members and help swell 
their ranks: join the union - and get a tax cut (Dubay 2010)." 
The Exit of Rep. Massa 
In early March 2010, it was announced that the House Ethics Committee 
was investigating Rep. Eric Massa (D-NY) concerning an inappropriate comment 
he may have made to a male staff-member at a New Year's Eve party. The next 
day Mr. Massa insisted there were ulterior motives involved; that the Democratic 
leaders wanted him out of office because he was against the health care reform 
bill. Massa claimed that President Obama's chief of staff Rahm Emanuel had 
harassed him in the shower of the House gym, screaming at him regarding the 
health care bill. Later that week, Rep. Massa resigned from office, saying "Mine 
21
 These are health care plans valued at $8,900 or more annually for individuals and $24,000 or more for 
families. 
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is now the deciding vote on the health care bill...and this administration and this 
House leadership have said, quote-unquote, they will stop at nothing to pass this 
health care bill. And now they've gotten rid of me, and it will pass. You connect 
the dots (Grieve 2010)." 
The Plane Ride 
Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) was against the health care bill because he 
felt it didn't go far enough; he supported the public option. On Monday, March 15, 
2010, Mr. Kucinich was taken by President Obama for a ride on Air Force One 
from Maryland to Cleveland, after which Mr. Kucinich announced that he had 
changed his mind, and would support the health care bill after all, even though he 
didn't like it. During the plane flight, the President had convinced Rep. Kucinich to 
vote for the bill - we shall likely never know the specifics of that conversation 
(Lothian 2010). 
The Deem and Pass Threat 
The self-executing rule, also called "deem and pass" is a procedure used 
by the House of Representatives to approve legislation; a bill is deemed to have 
been passed, without an actual vote on the bill itself. In March 2010, House rules 
chairwoman Louise Slaughter (D-NY) suggested the rule be used by the House 
to pass the Senate health care bill. The Washington Examiner reported that "[i]n 
the Slaughter Solution...House members would still have to vote on whether to 
accept the rule , but they would then be able to say they only voted for a rule, not 
for the bill itself (Tapscott 2010)." The deem and pass idea was so unpopular 
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with the public that the scheme was dropped, and the House vote of March 21, 
2010 on the health care bill took place in the normal manner. 
The Reconciliation Maneuver 
After voting on the Senate health care bill, the House then voted on some 
changes to the bill, referred to as "fixes". The next step was for the Senate to 
vote on the fixes; however, since the election of Scott Brown of Massachusetts, 
the Senate no longer had a 60-member filibuster-proof majority. 
Reconciliation is a process used in the Senate by which legislation is 
passed without the need for 60 votes; only 51 are needed. This fast-track 
process, usually used to reconcile the budget, is a very unpopular procedure. 
The Economist wrote that "[t]he Republicans claim that using reconciliation to 
pass amendments in the Senate with a bare majority offends against a tradition 
of bipartisan lawmaking in far-reaching social legislation (Miracle or monstrosity 
2010, 33)." Nevertheless, reconciliation was used successfully by the Senate 
when they passed the fixes on March 25, 2010 by a vote of 56-4322 
President Obama admitted that he was more concerned with the product 
than the process when this dialogue took place on March 17, 2010 during a 
television interview at the White House with Bret Baier of Fox News: 
Baier: So do you support the use of the Slaughter rule? The deem and 
pass rule...? 
Obama:... I don't spend a lot of time worrying about what the procedural 
rules are in the House and Senate. 
Baier:...[T]here are a lot of people around America that have a problem 
with this process. 
Obama: Bret, I -
22
 The roll call results of this vote can be found in Appendix D at the end of this paper. 
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Baier: You called it an ugly process last month. 
Obama: ...[T]he reason I think this conversation ends up being a little 
frustrating is because the focus entirely is on the Washington 
process (Foxnews.com 2010). 
Town Hall Meetings 
In late July 2009, President Obama was pressuring Congress to pass the 
health care bill before the August recess. When asked why the rush, Mr. Obama 
replied: "I'm rushed because I get letters every day from families that are being 
clobbered by health care costs. They ask me, 'Can you help (Stolberg, 2009, 1)?" 
Perhaps another reason for Mr. Obama's desire for the health care bill to 
be passed before the August 2009 recess was so that legislators would not be 
confronted by constituents' opposition to the plan when they went home and 
attended "town hall meetings". Town hall meetings present a forum for the 
expression of public opinion. They are events planned by legislators in their 
home districts or states, in which two-way personal communication regarding the 
issues of the day takes place between the office-holder and his or her 
constituents. 
During the summer of 2009, some lively discussions on health care reform 
took place at some of the town hall meetings. For example, on August 13, 2009, 
at a town hall meeting in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, Katy Abram said to Sen. Aden 
Specter (D-PA): 
I don't believe this is just about health care. It's not about TARP23, it's 
not about left and right. This is about the systematic dismantling of 
this country. I'm only thirty-five years old; I've never been interested 
in politics. You have awakened a sleeping giant (YouTube.com 2009). 
23
 TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008, involved the U.S. government purchase of assets and 
equity from financial institutions, at a cost of $700 billion, to strengthen the financial sector. 
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On August 18, 2009, at a town hall meeting in Dartmouth, Massachusetts, 
Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) was asked by a constituent: "Why are you supporting 
this Nazi policy?", to which Mr. Frank replied: "On what planet do you spend most 
of your time?" He later added: "Trying to have a conversation with you would be 
like arguing with a dining room table (Frank 2009)." 
Speaker Pelosi let her views on the town hall meetings be known on 
August 4, 2009, she called "congressional town hall events 'Astroturf, the 
Washington euphemism for a corporate public relations campaign disguised to 
look like a grass roots citizen movement (Murphy 2009)." 
The next day Speaker Pelosi degraded opponents of health care reform 
with the comment: "They're carrying swastikas and symbols like that to a town 
meeting on healthcare (Picket 2009)." This statement was an example of clever 
crafted talk: The Speaker, in her leadership role, was promoting the cause of 
health care reform by belittling those who opposed it. 
The Tea Party 
Another arena for the public to express its opinion is the modern Tea Party 
movement24, which originated in early 200925 as a protest against taxes and big 
government, and later against Democrats' health care reform efforts. For the 
most part, Tea Party groups are grassroots in origin, and conservative in nature. 
Named after the Dec. 16,1773 protest of taxation without representation by the British, particularly 
regarding the tax on tea, in which Boston colonists dumped tea into the harbor; this was an event which 
led to the American Revolution. 
25
 The Economist (Not for sale 2011,10) credits reporter Rick Santelli for calling for an anti-tax protest on 
Feb. 19, 2009 and starting the modern Tea Party momentum. 
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An important point should be made while on the topic of the Tea Parties. 
These groups of people are not part of a one-issue faction; discontent and 
disagreement with the general direction the government was taking in the early 
days of the Obama administration gave birth to the Tea Party movement. Federal 
actions such as taking over banks and car manufacturers, pushing for the new 
health care program, and adding to the immense federal debt26 "awoke a 
sleeping giant." 
President Obama, in an attempt to influence public opinion, commented 
on the Tea Party protests, saying: "When you see...folks waving tea bags 
around, let me remind them that I am happy to have a serious conversation 
about how we are going to cut our health care costs down over the long term 
(Obama 2009b)." 
Later, a week after the health care bill was signed into law on March 23, 
2010, President Obama made additional comments about the tea party 
movement, describing them as a "loose amalgam of forces", some of whom are 
"legitimately concerned about the deficit". He noted that "[fjhere's a part of the tea 
party movement that actually did exist before I was elected. There's [sic] some 
folks who just weren't sure whether I was born in the United States, whether I 
was a socialist. So there's that segment of it, which I think is just dug in 
ideologically (Politico 2010)." 
Political cartoons are a form of editorial which the print media may use as 
a method to mold public opinion. Figure 7 is a political cartoon with the subject 
26
 On June 2, 2010, The Washington Times reported that the federal debt had reached thirteen trillion 
dollars (Dinan 2010). 
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being the Tea Party. Note that the cartoon inaccurately depicts the relationship 
between the Republican Party (as symbolized by the elephant scientist) and the 
Tea Party (the Frankenstein monster). The Tea Party was not created or brought 
to life by the Republican Party; it was formed independently by a patch-work of 
factions. 
Figure 7 Tea Party Political Cartoon 
Source: Artizans.com 
Polls 
As the debate over health care intensified, a USA Today/Gallup poll on 
July 21, 2009 found that "more Americans disapprove (50 percent) than approve 
of the way President Barack Obama is handling healthcare policy. There is a 
tremendous partisan gap in these views, with 74 percent of Democrats but only 
11 percent of Republicans approving (Gallop.com 2009)." 
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H.R. 3962 
On Saturday, Nov. 7, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its 
version of national health care, H.R. 3962, called the "Affordable Health Care for 
America Act". It was a 220 to 215 vote, with only one Republican voting for the 
$1.2 trillion dollar bill. On December 24, 2009, the U.S. Senate passed its version 
of national health care, called the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" 
(PPACA, P.L 111-148) by a vote of 60-39 along party lines. The normal process 
of events would have then lead to a conference committee working out a 
compromise version of the health care bill, to be voted on by both the House and 
Senate, and then signed into law by the President. However, something gummed 
up the works. 
Mr. Brown 
On Jan. 19, 2010, an election took place in the state of Massachusetts 
that was referred to as "the Scott heard 'round the world."27 In a special election 
held for the Senate seat of the late Ted Kennedy, "Republican long-shot Scott 
Brown closed a 30-point gap with his heavily favored Democratic rival Martha 
Coakley (Heslam 2010, 4)" to win with 52 percent of the vote. Mr. Brown ran as 
the 41st vote against national health care, and his election in such a liberal state 
reflected public concern with President Obama's agenda. Boston mayor Thomas 
Menino remarked: "I think Scott Brown caught the wave of anger that's out there, 
and the wave of anti-Obama (Van Sack 2010, 2)". 
27
 This quote is a play on the words, "the shot heard 'round the world", which appeared in Ralph Waldo 
Emerson's poem "Concord Hymn", and referred to the beginning of the American Revolutionary War with 
the battle at Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts on April 19,1775. 
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Gallup reported that "[i]n the wake of Republican Scott Brown's victory in 
Tuesday's U.S. Senate election in Massachusetts, the majority of Americans 
(55%) favor Congress' putting the brakes on its current healthcare reform efforts 
and considering alternatives that can obtain more Republican support 
(Gallup.com 2010)." Events such as this are the reason that voting was included 
as an expression of public opinion in the Model. 
President Obama attempted to influence public opinion by putting his own 
spin on the Scott Brown victory. On Jan. 20, 2010, Mr. Obama told ABC News: 
Here's my assessment of not just the vote in Massachusetts, but 
the mood around the country: the same thing that swept Scott 
Brown into office swept me into office. People are angry and 
they are confused. Not just because of what's happened in the 
last year or two years, but what's happened over the last eight 
years (Travers 2010). 
Opinion Polls 
On March 14, 2010, The New York Times discussed the politics of public 
opinion. Note that this was a critical time in the health care reform debate, as 
President Obama was in the process of attempting to round up enough House 
votes to pass the Senate version of the health care plan so that he could sign the 
bill into law. Baker wrote that "[i]f Mr. Obama and the Democrats succeed, the 
challenge over the next eight months will be to convince the public that the 
program is better than polls suggest they think it is (Baker 2010)", meaning that 
since public opinion was against the health care bill, if it were to be passed by 
Congress, the public would then have to be convinced of the advantages of the 
plan before the November 2010 elections, or Democratic incumbents might fare 
poorly. 
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In fact, during the week of March 14, 2010 a public opinion survey took 
place which asked: "From what you have heard about Barack Obama's health 
care plan, do you think his plan is a good idea or a bad idea? If you do not have 
an opinion either way, please just say so (Pollster.com 2010a)." The results 
were: 36 percent, good idea, 48 percent, bad idea, and 15 percent, do not have 
opinion (ibid). This poll result added stress to those House members who were 
still undecided as to how to vote on the health care bill. 
That same week (March 13-16), a poll conducted by The Economist29 
asked the question: "Overall, given what you know about them, do you support or 
oppose changes to the health care system being developed by Congress and the 
Obama Administration?" The results were: 47 percent supported and 53 percent 
opposed the plan. 
Figure 8 is a graph (Pollster.com 2010a) which depicts public opposition to 
and favor of the national health care plan from February 2009 to November 2010. 
In February 2009 opposition to the plan was about 18 percent, favor was about 
48 percent. Opposition rose continually until a high point of about 56 percent in 
January 2010, before dipping slightly to the 53 percent of mid-March 2010, the 
time of the House vote on the Senate bill. Note that the percentage opposed to 
the bill continued to be higher than the percentage which favored the bill right up 
to the election of November 2010. 
This was an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll of 1000 adults with a margin of error of ± 3.10% (pollster.com 
2010a). 
29
 This was a poll of 1000 adults with a 4% margin of error (pollster.com2010b). 
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Deane (2010) wrote that "[i]n the weeks immediately before passage of 
health care reform, the multitude of public surveys seemed to agree on one main 
finding: in none of them did a significant majority of Americans say they favored 
the legislation that was about to pass (507)." In fact, many members of the public 
let their representatives know how they felt about the impending vote through a 
variety of methods. 
One of the outlets for expression of public opinion on legislation is 
telephone calls to policy-makers. The week before the March 21, 2010 House 
health care bill vote, there were a record number of such calls to the White 
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House switchboard, over 40,000 per hour, with most being in opposition to the 
bill (Yager 2010). 
A Sense of Urgency 
On March 20, 2010, the day before the House of Representatives was to 
vote on the Senate's health care bill, President Obama gave a pep talk to House 
Democrats. He communicated a sense of urgency when he said: "Don't do it for 
me - do it for the American people, they're the ones looking for action right now 
(Udenans 2010)." He noted that if they did not pass the health care plan, it would 
lessen their chances for re-election in November 2010, and that if they passed 
the bill, public opinion, which was currently against health care reform, might 
change by November. He said that "it may...be possible that they [the public] 
realize that after health reform passes and I sign that legislation into law, it's 
going to be a little harder to mischaracterize what this legislation has been all 
about (ibid)." 
That same day, Speaker Pelosi privately told President Obama: "We're in 
the majority. We'll never have a better majority in your presidency in numbers 
than we've got right now. We can make this work (Stolberg 2010)." 
Mr. Boehner's Speech 
Just before the House vote on the Senate health care bill on Sunday 
evening, March 21, 2010, Minority Leader John Boehner (R-OH) gave an 
impassioned speech urging House members to vote against the bill. Referring to 
public opinion and the will of the people, he said: 
When we came here, we each swore an oath to uphold and 
abide by the Constitution as representatives of the people. 
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But the process here is broken. The institution is broken. 
And as a result, this bill is not what the American people 
need, nor what our constituents want. Americans are making 
sacrifices and struggling to build a better future for their 
kids. And over the last year as the damn-the-torpedoes out-
line of this legislation became more clear, millions lifted 
their voices, and many for the first time, asking us to slow 
down, not try to cram through more than the system could 
handle... Shame on us... Shame on each and every one of you 
who substitutes your will and your desires above those of 
your fellow countrymen...If we pass this bill, there will be no 
turning back. It will be the last straw for the American people. 
And in a democracy, you can only ignore the will of the people 
for so long and get away with it. And if we defy the will of 
our fellow citizens and pass this bill, we are going to be held 
to account by those who have placed us in their trust (Boehner 
2010). 
Conservative Elites 
Rep. Boehner's speech was a last-ditch effort to convince some House 
Democrats to vote against the health-care bill; he knew the Republicans were 
already unified in their opposition to the bill. We have thus far only focused on the 
role of the liberal elites in the health care debate: The conservative elites, such 
as Mr. Boehner, also played a strong role in the drama. They created and 
maintained unity in their opposition to health care reform, reflected in Republican 
unanimity in the final health care reform votes in the House and Senate. In fact, 
the only bipartisan vote on health care was the House vote of March 21, 2010, in 
which both Democrats and Republicans voted against the health care bill, 
narrowly losing to an all-Democratic aye vote. Also, even though the 
conservative political elites failed to defeat health care reform, they did play a 
role in influencing public opinion. 
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Some members of Republican conservative elite, who played major roles 
in the 2009-2010 health care reform debate, besides Mr. Boehner, included: 1) 
Michael Steele, chairman of the Republican Party; 2) Mitch McConnell (R-KY), 
Senate Republican Leader; 3) Rep. Eric Cantor (R-VA), former House Minority 
Whip and current House Majority Leader; 4) Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-MN); 
and 5) Sarah Palin, former governor of Alaska. 
Michele Bachman, the chair of the House Tea Party Caucus, and strong 
critic of the health care reform bill, said on the House floor that "Obamacare is 
the crown jewel of socialism (Michele Bachmann 2011)." 
Mr. Steele and Republican Congressional leaders Boehner, McConnell, 
and Cantor, all fought tooth-and-nail against the health care reform plans of 
President Obama and the Democrats. They managed to unite House and Senate 
Republicans in this effort. 
Sarah Palin's death panel remark became stuck in the craw of the 
American psyche. The Pew Research Group reported in August 2009 that 
"among those who have heard about death panels... a sizable minority (30%) 
believes the health care legislation will create such organizations...Nearly half of 
Republicans (47%) say it is true that proposed health care legislation will create 
death panels (Pew Research 2009)." 
Another conservative force in the health care debate was talk-radio, 
featuring hosts such as Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Michael Savage, and 
Glenn Beck. These influential conservatives blasted health care reform on a daily 
basis. In fact, on January 19, 2009, regarding President Obama's agenda, Mr. 
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Limbaugh remarked: "I hope he fails (Limbaugh 2009)." Some of the millions of 
listeners to such programs were swayed to oppose health care reform. 
The Vote 
Directly after Mr. Boehner's impassioned speech of March 21, 2011, the 
House proceeded to pass the Senate version of the health care bill by a vote of 
219-21230. All 176 Republican House members voted against the bill; they were 
joined by 36 Democrats. The Economist succinctly summarized the events 
leading up to the March 21, 2010 vote, when it wrote: 
The health-care victory this week was a huge achievement for 
Mr. Obama. After the Democrats in January suddenly lost their 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, many...urged him to 
play for a draw and settle for a much more modest bill than the 
2,400-page behemoth that he signed into law on March 23rd. In-
stead, the president buckled down: he dumped the (more expen-
sive) House bill, concentrating on the Senate version and criss-
crossed the country, making powerful speeches and twisting 
arms...Universal health care has been a goal of Democrats for 
decades, so Mr. Obama's achieving something pretty near to it 
has perked up morale in his own party. But he has done a rotten 
job of selling it to everybody else. Most polls show more Amer-
icans oppose Obamacare than approve of it... (Now what? 2010, 
13). 
The New York Times briefly described the Democrats' health care reform 
victory and the long debate leading up to it, by saying: 
The victory for Mr. Obama and the Democratic leaders of 
Congress came after a roller-coaster year of negotiations, 
political combat, hearings delving into the minutiae of 
health care and a near-death political experience after 
they appeared to have reached the brink of success 
(Health care reform 2011). 
The roll call results of this House vote can be found in Appendix C of this paper. 
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National Journal Ratings 
One of the reasons health care reform was passed in 2010 contrary to 
public opinion was ideology, that is, the political beliefs of Congress. We know 
that the issue of health care reform is a polarizing one, and that support for the 
2010 health care bill falls to the left, or liberal side, of the ideological spectrum. 
Now we shall take a look at the ideology of the 111th Congress, to ascertain if it 
was unusually liberal. 
National Journal is a reputable weekly magazine which deals with politics. 
It publishes liberal and conservative ratings of members of Congress, which are 
based on roll-call votes on key economic, social, and foreign policy issues. 
National Journalist identifies those bills and amendments of most importance, 
with different weights given to each regarding importance. Then each 
congressperson's votes are counted as having been on the conservative or 
liberal side of the bill or amendment. Appendices A and B31, located at the end of 
this paper, are the 2010 liberal and conservative ratings of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, respectively. National Journal describes their 
methods in more detail thusly: 
1. All roll-call votes were examined (in 2010: 664 in House, 299 in Senate). 
2. Just under 100 votes were selected and categorized as dealing with 
economic, foreign, or social issues. 
3. Lists were downloaded from House and Senate websites showing how 
all members voted on selected votes. 
4. The votes in each issue-area were subjected to a principal-components 
analysis, a statistical procedure designed to determine the degree to 
which each vote resembled other votes in the same category. 
5. The yea and nay positions on each roll call were then identified as 
31
 The two charts presented in the Appendix were found at the NationalJournal website 
(http://www.nationaljournal.com libproxy.unh.edu). 
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conservative or liberal. 
6. Each roll call vote was assigned a weight from 1 (lowest) to 3 (high-
est) based on the degree to which it correlated with other votes in 
the same issue area. 
7. Absences and abstentions were not counted; a member who missed 
more than half the votes in any issue category was scored as "missing". 
8. Members were then ranked from the most liberal to the most con-
servative in each issue area. 
9. The liberal percentile score means that a member voted more liberal 
than that percentage of his or her colleagues in that issue area in 2010. 
10. The conservative figure means that a member voted more conserva-
tive than that percentage of his or her colleagues. 
11. For example, a House member in the 30th percentile of liberals and 
the 60th percentile of conservatives on economic issues voted more 
liberal than 30 percent of the House and more conservative than 60 
percent of the House on those issues, and was tied with the remaining 
10 percent. 
12. Members also receive a composite liberal score and a composite con-
servative score determined by their issue-based scores. 
13. To determine a member's composite liberal score, for example, first 
add the liberal scores in all three issue areas. Next, in each issue 
area, calculate 100 minus the member's conservative score and add 
the three results together. The two figures are then combined and 
divided by 6, the number of individual scores (How the ratings 2011). 
On a left/right spectrum diagram of ideology, one could describe National 
Journal's composite liberal ratings as falling into certain categories, as depicted 
in Table 4. 
Table 4 Liberal Ratings and Ideology 
Liberal Composite Rating Ideology 
0-25 Extreme Right 
26-50 Middle Right 
51-75 Middle Left 
76-100 Extreme Left 
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We can compare the liberal ratings of the 2010 U.S Senate, which passed 
health care reform, with those of the 1994 Senate, which did not even get to vote 
on health care reform. The 2010 Senate National Journal voter ratings32 are 
listed in Appendix B and the 1994 Senate ratings can be found in Appendix E. 
Calculating the liberal ratings of each Senator, then averaging the numbers, we 
find that the 1994 Senate had an average composite liberal rating of 49.9 and the 
2010 Senate had an average composite liberal rating of 56.6. Just those 6.7 
points of difference pushed the 2010 Senate liberal rating into the Middle Left 
category, enough change to make a difference on some votes. 
When we average the composite liberal ratings of all 219 members of the 
House of Representatives who voted for the health care bill on March 21, 2010 
(H.R. 3590, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), we come up with a 
figure of 77.7, which falls into the Extreme Left category of ideology. 
Democratic Control 
The high average liberal rating of the 111th Congress may have led in part 
to the passage of the health care bill; another factor was the simple fact that the 
Democrats were in the majority. Democratic control of both the Executive and 
Legislative branches created a rare opportunity for health care legislation to be 
pushed through. When asked why the health care bill was passed despite public 
32
 This information was found at: http://nationaljournal.com.libproxy.unh.edu/member/ 
Magazine/congress-how-they-voted-in-the-senate-in-1994-19950114 
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opinion against it, Sen. Susan Collins (D-ME) wrote that "[w]hile some public 
opinion polls showed significant opposition to these [health care reform] bills, the 
simple fact is the majority party had the votes to pass these bills, and the 
President was supportive of the legislation (2010)." 
One method of determining party power in the federal government 
involves an exercise in which one first figures the percentage of Democrats and 
Republicans33 in the House, Senate and White House. Then (assuming a 
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches), one averages 
the Senate and House figures, and then averages that number with the executive 
figure. The final two numbers arrived at are the "Democratic Power Number" and 
the "Republican Power Number", which can be used to compare different 
sessions of Congress. 
For example, in the 106th Congress (1999-2000)34 there were 223 
Republicans in the House (51 percent) and 55 in the Senate (55 percent); this 
made the Republican control of Congress 53 percent. However, the President 
was a Democrat, or zero percent Republican, so the Republican power number 
during the 1999-2000 session of Congress was 26.5. These calculations are 
presented in Table 5. Note that when the total Senate head count for a Congress 
do not add up to 100, or House head count to 435, it means that there were 
vacant seats when that session began. 
33
 Independents usually caucus with the Democrats, and are counted as such in this exercise. 
To determine which Congress was in session in what year, subtract 1787 from the year and divide by 
two. For example, take the year 2007. After the computations, the result is 110; thus 2007 was the first 
session of the 110th Congress (the second session would be 110.5). To convert Congressional session to 
year, multiply times two and add 1787. For example, take the I I I t h Congress; after computations, the 
result is 2009; thus the I I I t h session of Congress began in 2009. 
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Table 5 displays figures from the beginning of the 103rd (1993-94) to the 
111th (2009-2010) Congresses, and thus includes the periods of time of both the 
Clinton and Obama health care reform efforts. The 1993-94 (103rd) Congress, 
which was in office during the Clinton failed health care effort, had a Democratic 
Power Number of 79.3. This is the same high figure as the 2009-2010 (111th) 
Congress, during which Mr. Obama passed his health care bill. This shows that 
other factors besides just political party power were involved in the second case: 
Those factors were pressure from political elites and a sense of urgency. 
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Table 5 Total Power of Republican and Democratic Parties in the Federal 
Government During the 103rd to 111th Congresses (1993-2010) 
Congress 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th 108th 109th 110th 111th 
1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 
House 
D e m 259 (60%) 205 (47%) 207 (48%) 212 (49%) 211 (49%) 206 (47%) 201 (46%) 233 (54%) 256 (59%) 
R e p 176(40%) 230(53%) 228 (52%) 223 (51%) 221 (51%) 229 (53%) 232 (54%) 201 (46%) 178(41%) 
Senate 
D e m 57(57%) 47(47%) 45(45%) 45(45%) 50(50%) 49(49%) 45(45%) 45(45%) 57(58%) 
Rep 43(43%) 53(53%) 55(55%) 55(55%) 50(50%) 51(51%) 55(55%) 55(55%) 41(42%) 
President 
D e m 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
Rep 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
Power No. 
D e m 79.3 73.5 73.3 73.5 24.8 24 22.7 24.7 79.3 
R e p 20.7 26.5 26.7 26.5 75.2 76 77.3 75.3 20.7 
To calculate Party Power Numbers (example: Democrats in 107 Congress) 
1. Add number of Democrats in the House, convert to a percentage (211/432 = 49%) 
2. Add number of Democrats in Senate, convert to a percentage (50/100 = 50%) 
3. Add figures from steps 1 and 2, divide by two for percent of Democrats in Congress (49.5%) 
4. Calculate Democratic presidential power figure; Mr. Bush was president, so figure is zero 
5. Add answers from steps 3 and 4 and divide by two for total Democratic Power Number 
6. The Democratic Power Number for the 107th Congress (2001-2002) was 24.75 
(rounded to tenths, the figure is 24.8) 
Elite Cues: Pressure from Political Elites 
Even though some Democratic House members did not vote for the bill, 
enough did to pass it. Among those who voted "nay", some were against the bill, 
and had been given permission by party leadership to vote nay, in order to help 
their re-election chances in particular districts. The pressure and control 
exercised by political elites played a strong role in getting health care reform 
passed in 2010. 
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Congressional leaders are political elites who play key roles in getting 
legislation passed. Mikva and Lane (2009) recognized this when they wrote that 
"[t]he ability of a legislature to respond to problems perceived as needing 
legislative response depends on the existence of some formal leadership to 
administer the legislative process and meld disparate views toward a solution 
that will be acceptable to a majority of the legislators (86)." 
The many tasks of legislative leaders include: 1) orderly organizing 
consideration of legislative proposals; 2) promoting party support for or against 
legislation; 3) reconciling differences that threaten to disrupt the chambers; 4) 
planning strategy on important legislation; 5) consulting with the executive; and 
6) publicizing legislative achievements (ibid). One can find numerous examples 
during the 2009-2010 health care debate of the performances of the above tasks 
by House and Senate leadership, such as the inclusion of Hyde Amendment 
language in the health care bill to appease blue dog Democrats, and working 
with President Obama to drop the public option idea in order to get the bill 
passed. 
The intense pressure from political elites on legislators to pass the health 
care bill was both negative and positive in nature. On the positive side, promises 
were made, deals were negotiated, and quid pro quo arrangements were made. 
Some of these actions were described earlier in the section on "process" items. 
Negative pressure from the elites consisted of arm-twisting, threats, and 
other such tactics, some details of which we may never know. Examples of 
negative pressure on legislators from leadership to vote a certain way on a bill 
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might come in the way of threats to: 1) remove the legislator from a certain 
committee or chairmanship thereof; 2) release incriminating information about the 
legislator; 3) withhold certain federal funds from the legislator's state or district; 4) 
not support the legislator in the next election; and/or 5) not support the 
legislator's pet projects or bills. 
Public Reaction to the Healthcare Bill 
One week after the March 21, 2010 vote on health care, Gallup reported 
that Americans were nearly split in their reactions to the healthcare bill's 
passage. The question asked was: "As you may know, this past week Congress 
passed legislation that restructures the nation's healthcare system. All in all, do 
you think it is a good thing or a bad thing that Congress passed this legislation 
(Saad 2010)?" The response35 was good, 47 percent; bad, 50 percent; and no 
opinion, 3 percent. Shown below is Table 6, which depicts the breakdown of 
results by political party identification. 
Table 6 Reaction to Passing Healthcare Reform, by Party ID 
Good thing Bad thing 
% % 
Democrat 81 15 
Independent 43 54 
Republican 11 86 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll, March 26-28, 2010 (n=1,033). 
35
 Results were based on telephone interviews of 1,033 national adults, aged 18 and over, conducted 
March 26-28, 2010. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% 
confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ± 4 percentage points (Saad 2010). 
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The House vote of March 21, 2010 was followed by President Obama's signing 
of H.R. 3590, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, on March 23, 
2010, and then the Senate36 wrapped things up a few days later. This con-
cludes the narrative of the 2009-2010 health care debate. The next chapter is a 
narrative of the events which took place after the March 23, 2010 signing of the 
bill. 
36
 The roll call results of the Senate vote of March 25, 2010 on the reconciliation bill can be found in 
Appendix D of this paper. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AFTER THE BILL WAS SIGNED 
It's Been a Week. Folks 
One week after the health care bill was signed on March 23, 2010, the 
American public was still bitterly divided over health care reform. When 
journalists brought this to President Obama's attention, he responded thusly: 
Every single day since I signed the reform law, there's been 
another poll or headline that said, "Nation still divided on health 
care reform." It just happened last week! Can you imagine if 
some of these reporters were working on a farm and you plant-
ed some seeds and they came out next day and they looked -
"Nothing's happened! There's no crop! We're going to starve! 
Oh no! It's a disaster!" It's been a week, folks (Obama mocks 
journalists 2010). 
Mr. Obama was mocking those who reported the polarity of opinion on 
health care reform after its passage. Unhappy with the message, he chose to 
attack the messengers. At the time of the above comments, 50 percent of the 
American public thought that the health care reform bill was a bad thing.37 
Public Support After a Bill is Passed 
In most cases in which public opinion is against the passage of a bill, once 
the bill is passed, the public comes to accept the reality of the situation, and 
eventually comes to support the bill. An example of this is the expansion of the 
37
 Based on a USA Today/Gallup telephone poll on March 26-28, 2010 of 1,033 national adults, aged 18 
and over, MoE ± 4% (Saad 2010). 
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Medicare program in 2008 to include a prescription drug program. The change 
was "viewed unfavorably by a majority of Americans on passage, as was the 
decision to expand the program using private insurance plans as a vehicle. Yet it 
passed both houses of Congress, was signed by President George W. Bush, and 
once the new benefits were implemented, became a popular new program 
(Deane 2010, 508)." 
Many politicians, including President Obama, Speaker Pelosi, and Sen. 
Reid, thought that the American public would accept the details of the bill and 
vote favorably for the Democrats in the November 2010 election. In August 2009, 
while the health care debate was raging, Bill Clinton made a prediction, in which 
he said, "I'm telling you, I don't care how long they drive support for this 
misinformation. The minute the president signs the health care reform bill, 
approval will go up, because Americans are inherently optimistic (Brown 2010a)." 
But that was not to be the case. Regarding public concerns about the health care 
bill, Deane wrote: 
Advocates of this particular health reform bill faced some very 
steep public opinion challenges. In one important way, they 
overcame the challenges: the bill is now law. In another way, 
however, advocates were less successful. The public remains 
quite divided on the final legislation, even as they look favor-
ably on many of its component parts. Chief among the public 
opinion concerns were paying for the expansion (raising the 
issue of national and personal costs), the threat people felt 
to their personal health care status quo, and the extreme par-
tisan divisions within the general public, focusing primarily on 




In June 2010, three months after the healthcare reform bill was signed into 
law, 50 percent of Americans38 favored Congress' repealing all or much of the 
law (Saad 2010b). Of note is the fact that "on the basis of age, the largest well of 
opposition is found among seniors, 60% of whom call passage of the bill a bad 
thing (ibid)." Table 7 depicts Gallup Poll results of April and June 2010. 
































Source: Gallup polls of June & April, 2010 (n=1,014, MoE ±4%). 
With this information in mind, in late July 2010, a television ad began 
appearing on certain cable stations throughout the country. This ad, put on by 
Medicare, featured an elderly Andy Griffith touting the virtues of the new 
healthcare system. Mr. Griffith said that "[wjith the new health care law, more 
good things are coming. I think you're going to like it (Belsie 2010)." The actor's 
38
 Gallup poll of June 11-13, 2010. Results based on telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,014 
adults and a sampling error of ±4% points. 
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informal, down-home manner of speaking was reminiscent of the Harry and 
Louise ads, only this time the ad was designed to promote, not criticize, health 
care reform. 
The Griffith ad showed that President Obama was very concerned with the 
skepticism of older voters, even months after the health care bill was passed. In 
his weekly radio address of Aug. 7, 2010, Mr. Obama said: "We've made 
Medicare more solvent by going after waste, fraud, and abuse — not by 
changing seniors' guaranteed benefits. In fact, seniors are starting to see that 
because of health reform, their benefits are getting better all the time (Brown 
2010b)." 
Public Concerns 
One must pause and look at the larger picture regarding public concerns, 
in order to put the topic of health care in context. After the economy took a 
nosedive in late 2008, the American public was very concerned about a string of 
economic issues: taxes, unemployment, the federal budget deficit and debt, as 
well as the economic impact of a new health care reform program. In August 
2010, a poll39 revealed that "60% of Americans mentioned some aspect of the 
economy as a problem facing the country (Newport 2010)." In July 2010, Sen. 
Susan Collins (R-ME) wrote: 
I have serious concerns about their [health care bills] financial 
structure, which includes an array of new taxes, fees, and 
penalties on businesses, as well as pharmaceutical companies 
and medical device manufacturers. I am also concerned that 
these bills are financed through deep cuts to Medicare, a 
39
 Gallup telephone poll of a random sample of 1,013 adults living in 50 states and Washington, DC 
conducted Aug. 5-8, 2010 with a sampling error of ±4%. 
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program which already has long-term financing problems 
(Collins 2010). 
After the health care bill became law on March 23, 2010, approval ratings 
of President Obama and Congress continued to be low. On Aug. 12, 2010 
President Obama's disapproval rating was at an all-time high of 50.7 percent 
(Pollster.com 2010c). This was due in a large part to the bad economy, with 9.6 
percent unemployment, but also President Obama's late reaction to the BP oil 
spill crisis, and in part to apprehension concerning future ramifications of the 
health care law. 
As the mid-term election of Nov. 2, 2010 approached, it was clear that the 
Obama administration wanted to put the health care reform bill on the back 
burner; this was due to a fear that a low public opinion of the bill might have a 
negative effect on Democratic incumbents in the mid-term election. Mr. Obama 
was still trying to sway public opinion concerning health care reform even after 
the bill was passed; however, his motivation was no longer to encourage law-
makers and the public to support passage of the bill: Now Mr. Obama was 
concerned with the effect negative public opinion of the health care law might 
have on the November 2010 election. 
Table 8 is depicts the results of a USA/Gallup poll taken just after the Nov. 
2, 2010 election, regarding public opinion on the health care overhaul. Note that 
the category "goes too far" is broken down into specifics, the numbers of which 
are in bold print. 
87 
Table 8 Views of Healthcare Overhaul, by Party Affiliation, November 2010 
Goes too far 
Should keep in place but 
scale back considerably 
Should repeal and 
work on new bill 
Should repeal and 
not pass a new law 
Is about right 





























Note: "Goes too far" view is divided into three subcategories. 
Source: USA Today/Gallup poll, Nov. 4-7, 2010 (n=1,021, MoE ±4%). 
The Ghost of the Public Option 
Although the public option idea was dropped before the health care bill 
was passed, President Obama made reference to it at a Dec. 7, 2010 news 
conference. With regard to the compromise on renewing Bush-era tax cuts, when 
Mr. Obama was asked about his core values, he replied: 
[Tjhis notion that somehow we are willing to compromise too much 
reminds me of the debate that we had during health care. This is 
the public option debate all over again. So I pass a signature piece 
of legislation where we finally get health care for all Americans, 
something that Democrats had been fighting for for a hundred years, 
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but because there was a provision in there that they didn't get that 
would have affected maybe a couple of million people, even though 
we got health insurance for 30 million people and the potential for 
lower premiums for 100 million people, that was a sign of weakness 
and compromise (Obama 2010a). 
In the above remarks, Mr. Obama mentioned that Democrats had been 
fighting for health care reform for a century. Due to the urgency of the moment, 
that is, the possibility of finally achieving the goal of health care reform, Mr. 
Obama was willing to compromise and drop the public option idea. The public 
option was dead; but would it stay dead? On July 27, 2010, Sen. Harry Reid (D-
NE) remarked: "I wish we had a public option. But we're going to have a public 
option. It's a question of when (Clabough 2010)." 
Election 2010 
The election of Nov. 2, 2010 was historic. Though not as unexpected as 
the results of the 1994 election, the results of the 2010 election were just as 
dramatic. In fact, Republicans gained more House seats in the latter election. 
The New York Times wrote that "discontented voters, frustrated about the 
nation's economic woes, turned sharply against President Obama just two years 
after catapulting him into the White House (Zeleny and Herszenhorn 2010)." The 
Hillwrote: "Democrats who voted for their party's signature domestic 
achievement dropped like flies throughout the evening, adding credence to 
Republicans' claim that the American public wants them to repeal healthcare 
reform (Pecquet 2010)." 
Regarding the results of the midterm elections, Rep. John Boehner said: 
"[W]e are witnessing a repudiation of Washington... a repudiation of Big 
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Government...and a repudiation of politicians who refuse to listen to the people 
(Malcolm 2010)." 
At a press conference the day after the election, President Obama said: "I 
think over the past two years, we have made a series of very tough decisions, 
but decisions that were right in terms of moving the country forward (Obama 
2010b)." At the same event, when Mr. Obama was asked if health care reform 
was in danger of being repealed, considering the results of the election, he 
replied, "I think we'd be misreading the election if we thought that the American 
people want to see us for the next two years relitigate arguments that we had 
over the last two years (ibid)". 
Mr. Boehner and Mr. Obama were both using crafted talk to spin their own 
interpretations of the Nov. 2, 2010 election. Regardless of the political ideology 
one adheres to, it was plain that in the 2010 election, the economy was the 
headline issue in the minds of the American people, and health care reform, 
although now the law of the land, would continue to be debated. 
We now return to the topic of the election results of Nov. 2, 2010; when 
the dust finally settled, the Republicans had gained 63 seats in the House, and 
control of that body (242-193) in the biggest House victory of either party in a 
midterm election since 1938. In the Senate, the Republicans gained six seats, 
making the new Senate a group of 51 Democrats, 2 Independents, and 47 
Republicans. 
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At the state level, great gains were also made by Republicans in 
legislatures and governorships.40 The Economist mote that "[tjhese tectonic 
shifts at state level may turn out to be even more important than those in 
Congress (In the red, 42)." One reason for this is the fact that 2011 would be a 
crucial year for state legislators, as the 2010 census results would be used by 
them to devise new voting districts. 
A Three-pronged Strategy 
The attempt by Republicans to kill the new health care law in the 112th 
Congress involved a three-pronged attack: 1) the court fight on the 
constitutionality of the law; 2) repeal of the law; and 3) defunding the law- not 
allowing monies to be spent on the law's provisions. 
The Court Cases 
As mentioned previously, there was concern that the health care law might 
be unconstitutional. In fact, minutes after President Obama signed the law on 
March 23, 2010, Florida's attorney general Bill McCollum filed a lawsuit. Twenty-
five other states eventually joined Florida as plaintiffs. 
One reason that states contested the health care law has to do with the 
tenth amendment to the Constitution, which states that "[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people (U.S. 
Constitution, 10th amend.)." 
In my home state of Maine, both bodies of the legislature and the governorship moved from 
Democratic to Republican hands; this was the first time in fifty years that the Republicans have had such 
power. 
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Madison wrote, in Federalist 45, that "[t]he powers delegated by 
the...Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which 
are to remain in state governments are numerous and indefinite (Madison et al 
1999, 260)." The states contend that certain aspects of the health care law are 
beyond the scope of the power of the federal government and infringe on the 
rights of the individual states. 
Specifically, the McCollum case challenged: 1) the law's "overhaul of 
Medicaid which the states argue amounted to the federal government coercing 
states to participate (Morrison 2010)"; and 2) the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate in the health care law. 
As of May 1, 2011, there have been five court findings in cases involving 
the health care bill. The bill was found to be constitutional by district courts in 
Virginia and Michigan, in cases filed by conservative organizations. 
In the third case, brought by Virginia's attorney general Ken Cuccinelli, 
Virginia District Court Judge Henry Hudson ruled on December 13, 2010 that the 
individual mandate section of the health care bill was unconstitutional. However, 
Judge Hudson declined to prevent implementation of the health care law, as the 
individual mandate is not scheduled to go into effect until 2014. 
In the fourth case to be decided, the earlier-mentioned McCollum 
case, Judge Roger Vinson of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District 
of Florida ruled that "the [health care] law's requirement that nearly all Americans 
purchase health insurance is not within the legal bounds of Congress's power 
under the commerce clause (Habberkorn 2011a)." 
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Judge Vinson's ruling of January 31, 2011 found that the individual 
mandate requirement was unconstitutional, and therefore the entire health care 
reform bill is unconstitutional.41 Judge Vinson also ruled on the second matter in 
the case, finding that the law did not violate state sovereignty by requiring states 
to pay for a share of Medicaid expansion. 
Regarding the individual mandate, Judge Vinson asserted: "If Congress 
can penalize a passive individual for failing to engage in commerce, the 
enumeration of powers in the Constitution would have been in vain (Sack 2011)." 
Judge Vinson declined to suspend the health care law at the time of his decision, 
pending appeals; on March 8, 2011 the Obama administration filed an appeal of 
Judge Vinson's decision. 
The fifth court case involving the health care bill was heard in U.S. District 
Court in Washington, D.C. on February 23, 2011. Judge Gladys Kessler 
dismissed a lawsuit filed by evangelical Christians who claimed they should not 
be forced to buy health insurance because they rely on God to protect them. 
Judge Kessler noted that the Supreme Court will need to settle the constitutional 
issues in the matter. Concerning that possibility, Newsweek wrote: 
The court safeguards its public esteem carefully, and the 
justices' willingness to overturn an act of Congress depends 
in part on how much public backlash they think it will provoke. 
All of which just goes to show that if opponents of health-care 
reform really want to banish it for good, they will need to win 
an argument in a much more important court than a district 
court in Virginia: the court of public opinion (Adler 2010). 
This is because the health care law does not have a severability clause, which would enable courts to 
strike down only a portion of the law. 
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The Repeal Effort 
Any effort to repeal the new health care law would merely be a symbolic 
gesture, due to the Democratic majority in the Senate, and the certainty of a veto 
by President Obama. During a poll42 on January 4-5, 2011, Gallup asked this 
question: 
As you may know, a vote is scheduled in the House of Repre-
sentatives next week on a proposed bill that would repeal 
the healthcare overhaul legislation that became law last March. 
Would you want your representative in Congress to vote 
"yes" to repeal the healthcare law or to vote "no" and let the 
healthcare law stand (Jones 2011)? 
The results of the poll were: 46 percent, vote to repeal; 40 percent, vote to 
let stand; and 14 percent, no opinion. Regarding criticism and repeal attempts of 
the health care reform law, Slate magazine wrote: 
Health care now becomes a policy story rather than a legislative 
sausage-grinding story. Tales of death panels and warnings about 
losing your doctor can now be falsified...And Republicans who de-
nounce the program and promise to repeal it will no longer be bash-
ing an abstraction. They will be proposing to take away existing, tan-
gible benefits (Saletan 2009). 
Nevertheless, on January 19, 2011, the House voted 245 to 189 in favor 
of repeal of the health care law. A few weeks later Politico reported that on 
February 2, 2011 in the U.S. Senate, "[a] Republican amendment to repeal the 
entire health reform law... fell along party lines, 47-51, in a procedural vote 
(Haberkorn 2011b)." 
This Gallup poll consisted of telephone interviews conducted Jan. 4-5, 2011 on a random sample of 
1,025 adults aged 18 and over, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia; MoE ±4%. 
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Defunding 
In a last-minute deal, in order to prevent a government shut-down, 
President Obama and Congressional leaders on April 8, 2011 agreed to a 
tentative 2011 budget, to be voted on by House and Senate members the next 
week. Part of this agreement, in a concession to Republican leaders, included 
the opportunity for the House of Representatives to have an up-or-down vote on 
defunding the new health care law. This vote took place on April 14, 2011; the 
result was 239-187 for defunding for the rest of fiscal 2011. However, the 
amendment lacked support from President Obama and the Democratic-run 
Senate. 
Politics as Usual 
As with most legislation, the health care bill was written with politics in 
mind. Some of the benefits of the plan were timed to begin on September 23, 
2010, six months after the signing of the bill, and just before the midterm 
elections. These benefits require insurance companies to: 1) cease excluding 
children due to pre-existing conditions; 2) cease imposing lifetime limits on 
benefits; 3) offer coverage to children under 26 on their parents' policies; and 4) 
drop co-payments on certain procedures43 (Sack 2010). The specific timing of 
benefits is a strategy which creates an atmosphere which makes attempts to 
repeal the health care law difficult, as persons receiving such benefits would 
certainly not want to face the possibility of losing them. As with most 
These preventive procedures include colonoscopies, mammograms and immunizations. 
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entitlements, certain health care benefits would be difficult to withdraw at a future 
date. 
On the other hand, the "bitter pill" of health care reform, the individual 
mandate requirement, was timed to begin on January 1, 2014. Also, many of the 
new taxes to help fund the health care program are set to begin in 2013 and 
beyond (Ellis 2011), some examples of which are (dates of implementation in 
parentheses): 1) a tax on employers which do not offer health coverage (2014); 
2) an excise tax on comprehensive health insurance plans (2018); 3) a tax on 
medical device manufacturers (2013); 4) a surtax on investment income (2013); 
and 5) a tax on health insurers based on premiums collected (2014). 
One Year Later 
In late March, 2011, one year after President Obama signed the health 
care bill into law, The Economist wrote: 
When Barack Obama signed a sweeping set of health reforms 
into law on March 23rd 2010, he knew it was a historic moment... 
he had successfully ridden the wave of popular support that 
brought him into office to deliver universal health coverage, a 
feat that eluded all his predecessors. But the reality of politics has 
obstructed the grand dream. Republican leaders in Congress are 
trying to repeal the law outright. Several federal judges have ruled 
one of the central provisions of the new reforms, an "individual 
mandate" requiring everyone to purchase coverage, is unconstit-
utional. And a recent poll...revealed that hostility to the laws a-
mong politically vital independents has shot up sharply (A not very 
happy birthday 2011, 37). 
A Gallup poll44 reported in late March 2011 that Democrats continued to 
be highly positive about the health care law, while Republicans were highly 
Results are based on telephone interviews conducted March 18-19,1011, on the Gallup Daily tracking 
survey, with a random sampling of 1,038 adults, aged 18+, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of 
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negative. While 74 percent of Republicans polled said that the law was a bad 
idea, only 14 percent of Democrats polled said that. 
Overall, "Americans are divided on its [Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act] passage, with 46% saying it was a good thing and 44% saying it was a 
bad thing [10% gave no opinion]. Most Americans are skeptical that the law will 
improve medical care in the U.S. or their own personal medical care (Newport 
2011)." Gallup reported that 70% of those polled said that the law would not 
change, or would worsen, their own medical care. 
Pollster John Zogby made this prediction when the health care bill passed 
in March 2010: "This sets the scene for an ideological war, the likes of which we 
have rarely seen in the U.S. (Hallow 2010)." The passage by Congress of the 
2010 health care law against the wishes of the American people was an 
anomaly; perhaps the events which take place regarding the law in the next few 
years will be just as amazing. 
Columbia, selected using random-digit dial sampling. For results based on the total sample of national 
adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error is +4 percentage points. 
97 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: THE PERFECT STORM 
An Anomaly 
The Economist called the 2010 passage of universal health care "the 
fondest of liberal ambitions for decades (Disappointed 2010)." The fact that 
Congress voted against the direct wishes of the public regarding health care 
reform was an anomaly. Usually on important issues, policy tends to reflect 
public opinion. Erikson and Tedin (2007) wrote: "One important nuance about the 
opinion-policy relationship is that the public is most likely to get its way when the 
matter is highly salient. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find instances of 
Congress passing major legislation even though the polls say the public 
disapproves (328)." 
The Perfect Storm 
So why did Congress fail to reflect the will of the people in passing health 
care reform in 2010? One could compare the combination of factors which made 
the passage of the health care bill possible in 2010 to a "perfect storm." Like a 
once-in-a-century meteorological phenomenon, during the 2009-2010 health care 
debate an unusual event occurred, due to a rare combination of elements. These 
elements, depicted in Figure 9, were: 1) Democratic control of both the executive 
and legislative branches of the U.S. government; 2) intense pressure from 
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political elites, notably President Obama, Sen. Reid, and Rep. Pelosi; 3) 
polarization of both the American public and the Republican and Democratic 
parties, on the issue of health care reform; and 4) a great sense of urgency. It 
was the rare combination of these four extreme elements at a specific place and 
time which created the turbulent result which was the 2010 passage of health 
care reform legislation despite U.S. public opinion being against it. 
Figure 9 The Perfect Storm 
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Two of the four elements in the perfect storm can be described using 
variables in the Model of Public Opinion and Policy: Democratic control of the 
Executive and Legislative branches deals with ideology, and intense pressure 
from political elites is a form of elite cues. These two elements were certainly 
present in the political reality of 2009-2010, and are described in Chapter Four of 
this paper. 
The 2010 health care reform bill most likely would not have passed if the 
Democrats had not controlled both houses of Congress and the White House; at 
the beginning of the 111th Congress, the Democrats led the Republicans 256-178 
in the House and 57-41 in the Senate, and the President was also a Democrat. 
This control of power by Democrats, as described in Chapter Four, was the 
foundation for the eventual victory in the health care vote. 
Pressure from Democratic political elites involved the use of their 
leadership powers and crafted talk; President Obama, Speaker Pelosi, and 
Majority Leader Reid each applied great effort in pushing for passage of the 
health care bill. The Economist wrote that Speaker Pelosi "spent most of her 
tenure rather effectively, but not very pleasantly, strong-arming recalcitrant 
Democrats...by hook, crook and gavel (Passing the gavel 2010, 41). 
Chapter Four described some examples of process events by which 
Democratic elites garnered votes for the health care bill in a variety of ways, i.e. 
the "Cornhusker Kickback", the "Louisiana Purchase", and "The Plane Ride". 
Democratic Congressional leaders are political elites who effort to get bills 
passed by performing such tasks as: 
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1. Organizing orderly considerations of executive proposals 
2. Promoting party support for or against legislation 
3. Attempting to reconcile differences that threaten to disrupt the chambers 
4. Planning strategy on important legislation 
5. Consulting with the President 
6. Publicizing legislative achievements (Mikva and Lane 2009, 87) 
As described in Chapter Four, during the 2009-2010 health care debate, 
Democratic leaders performed all the above tasks in the effort for health care 
reform. One example concerns promoting party support for legislation, in which 
details of the health care bill were constantly changing as it slowly evolved into a 
finished product that would receive enough votes to become law. 
As described in Chapter Four, as president, Mr. Obama was in a unique 
position to communicate with Congress and the public on the issue of health care 
reform. To begin with, Mr. Obama rightfully claimed that there was in November 
2008 a mandate45 for health care reform. He then used every weapon in his 
arsenal in the effort to get health care reform passed - and was rewarded with 
eventual success. 
As described in Chapter One, polarization of: 1) the American public; 2) 
the Democratic and Republican parties; and 3) the Congress, all played a big 
role in getting health care reform passed. The polarizing of opinions on many 
issues has increased dramatically in recent years; on September 21, 2010, 
former President Jimmy Carter told NBC News: 
This country has become so polarized that it's almost aston-
ishing... Not only with the red and blue states...President 
Obama suffers from the most polarized situation in Wash-
ington that we have ever seen - maybe than the time of 
Abraham Lincoln and the initiation of the war between the 
45
 "Mandate: A claim by a victorious candidate that the election has given him or her special authority to 
carry out promises made during the campaign (Lowi 2010, 252)." 
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states (Lubin 2010). 
The National Journal described this phenomenon with respect to the 
Republican and Democratic parties with these words: 
For most of American history, the two parties operated as 
ramshackle coalitions that harbored diverse and even antithetical 
views. Each party's Senate caucus housed ideological antagonists, 
such as progressive Democratic titan Hubert Humphrey of Minne-
sota and segregationist stalwart Richard Russell of Georgia, or New 
Right Republican firebrand Jesse Helms of North Carolina and silk-
stocking New York City liberal Jacob Javits. Such contrasts are not 
extinct. But since the early 1980s, they have vastly diminished as the 
differences within each party have narrowed and the distance between 
them has widened (Brownstein 2011). 
The polarization of opinion on health care reform was reflected in a poll by 
The Economist in late March 2010, which showed that 53 percent of the 
American people were against the health care plan, and 47 percent were for it. 
The important House vote of March 21, 2010 on the health care bill was 51 
percent for and 49 percent against the bill. Both Democratic and Republican 
policy-makers were united in opinion, holding opposite views of the health care 
plan. In fact, the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" passed by a 
Senate vote of 60-39, strictly along party lines. 
A Great Sense of Urgency 
The great sense of urgency regarding health care reform served as a 
catalyst, igniting the passion of the political elites and letting them use their 
majority power to pass health care reform against the will of the people. The 
sense of urgency was the underlying force which trumped public opinion in the 
case of health care reform; the health care bill had to be passed while the 
window of opportunity was open. It was as if the stars were in perfect alignment 
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for the bill to be passed, and the public be damned. There was a now-or-never 
mentality among Democratic legislators, a feeling that they should strike while 
the iron was hot, even if it meant an election loss in November 2010. With regard 
to the great sense of urgency in the 2009-2010 health care reform debate, the 
Economist wrote: 
The health-reform plan represents the last chance, perhaps 
for decades, of erasing one of the least creditable differences 
between America and the rest of the industrialized world. If 
this president, who came into office with solid congressional 
majorities and stratospheric ratings fails, neither he nor his 
successors will dare touch health care for many years to 
come (Pass the bill 2010). 
Similarly, William Saletan wrote in Slate: 
Politicians have tried and failed for decades to enact universal 
health care. This time, they succeeded. In 2008, Democrats 
won the presidency and both houses of Congress, and by the 
thinnest of margins, they rammed a bill through. They weren't 
going to get another opportunity for a very long time. It cost 
them their majority and it was worth it (Saletan 2010). 
As one analyzes the health care reform debate of 2009-2010, one is 
stunned by the great sense of urgency, the vital importance given to the passage 
of the health care bill, and the passion of the political elites. Then the realization 
sets in that perhaps the health care bill was, to some, above and beyond the 
politics of the moment. Perhaps the healthcare bill was more important than one 
election. President George W. Bush's former speechwriter David Frum echoed 
this thought when he said: "Legislative majorities come and go. The healthcare 
bill is forever (Saleton 2010)." 
Reflecting on Vice President Biden's comment of March 23, 2010, one 
must concur with Mr. Biden that the health care bill was indeed a "big f—ing 
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deal." Some Democratic legislators' careers were fated to end on Nov. 2, 2010 
due to their support of the health care bill, and they considered the loss a 
sacrifice for a greater cause. The day after the election, President Obama said: 
"[TJhere are just some terrific members of Congress who took 
really tough votes because they thought it was the right thing, 
even though they knew this could cause them political prob-
lems... And the amount of courage that they showed and con-
viction that they showed is something that I admire so much. 
I can't overstate it (Obama 2010). 
The health care bill was perhaps a bigger deal than the 2010 election. By 
passing the bill, Democrats may have won the most important battle of 2010. 
Saletan wrote that although 
Politicians rationalize their self-preservation by imagining 
themselves as dynasty builders...The big picture isn't 
about winning or keeping power. It's about using it...A party 
that loses a House seat can win it back two years later... 
But a party that loses a legislative fight against a middle-class 
entitlement never restores the old order...Most bills aren't more 
important than elections. This one was (Saletan 2010). 
The great sense of importance pertaining to the health care bill created an 
urgency that empowered the three political elites (President Obama, Sen. Reid 
and Speaker Pelosi) to push the massive health care bill through with a steely 
determination, against great odds, and against the wishes of the American 
people. 
This steely determination was reflected in the words of Speaker Pelosi in 
late January 2010, when health care reform looked dead in the water. Seemingly 
undeterred by the results of the Jan. 19, 2010 Scott Brown victory in 
Massachusetts, Pelosi said: "We go through the gate. If the gate's closed, we go 
over the fence. If the fence is too high, we'll pole-vault in. If that doesn't work, 
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we'll parachute in. But we're going to get health care reform passed for the 
American people (Sargent 2010)." 
And it was done. 
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ROLL CALL RESULTS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
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ROLL CALL RESULTS, UNITED STATES SENATE 
H.R. 4872: HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION 
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 
MARCH 25, 2010 
Vote Counts: YEAs 56, NAYs 43, Not Voting 1 
Akaka (D-HI), Yea 
Alexander (R-TN), Nay 
Barrasso (R-WY), Nay 
Baucus (D-MT), Yea 
Bayh (D-IN), Yea 
Begich (D-AK), Yea 
Bennet (D-CO), Yea 
Bennett (R-UT), Nay 
Bingaman (D-NM), Yea 
Bond (R-MO), Nay 
Boxer (D-CA), Yea 
Brown (D-OH), Yea 
Brown (R-MA), Nay 
Brownback (R-KS), Nay 
Bunning (R-KY), Nay 
Burr (R-NC), Nay 
Burns (D-IL), Yea 
Byrd (D-WV), Yea 
Cantwell (D-WA), Yea 
Cardin (D-MD), Yea 
Carper (D-DE), Yea 
Casey (D-PA), Yea 
Chambliss (R-GA), Nay 
Coburn (R-OK), Nay 
Cochran (R-MS), Nay 
Collins (R-ME), Nay 
Conrad (D-ND), Yea 
Corker (R-TN), Nay 
Cornyn (R-TX), Nay 
Crapo (R-ID), Nay 
DeMint (R-SC), Nay 
Dodd (D-CT), Yea 
Dorgan (D-ND), Yea 
Durbin (D-IL), Yea 
Ensign (R-NV), Nay 
Enzi (R-WY), Nay 
Feingold (D-WI), Yea 
Feinstein (D-CA), Yea 
Franken (D-MN), Yea 
Gillibrand (D-NY), Yea 
Graham (R-SC), Nay 
Grassley (R-IA), Nay 
Gregg (R-NH), Nay 
Hagan (D-NC), Yea 
Harkin (D-IA), Yea 
Hatch (R-UT), Nay 
Hutchison (R-TX), Nay 
Inhofe (R-OK), Nay 
Inouye (D-HI), Yea 
Isakson (R-GA), Not Voting 
Johanns (R-NE), Nay 
Johnson (D-SD), Yea 
Kaufman (D-DE), Yea 
Kerry (D-MA), Yea 
Klobuchar (D-MN), Yea 
Kohl (D-WI), Yea 
Kyi (R-AZ), Nay 
Landneu (D-LA), Yea 
Lautenberg (D-NJ), Yea 
Leahy (D-VT), Yea 
LeMieux (R-FL), Nay 
Levin (D-MI), Yea 
Lieberman (ID-CT), Yea 
Lincoln (D-AR), Nay 
Lugar (R-IN), Nay 
McCain (R-AZ), Nay 
McCaskill (D-MO), Yea 
McConnell (R-KY), Nay 
Menendez (D-NJ), Yea 
Merkley (D-OR), Yea 
Mikulski (D-MD), Yea 
Murkowski (R-AK), Nay 
Murray (D-WA), Yea 
Nelson (D-FL), Yea 
Nelson (D-NE), Nay 
Pryor (D-AR), Nay 
Reed (D-RI), Yea 
Reid (D-NV), Yea 
Risch (R-ID), Nay 
Roberts (R-KS), Nay 
Rockefeller (D-WV), Yea 
Sanders (l-VT), Yea 
Schumer (D-NY), Yea 
Sessions (R-AL) Nay 
Shaheen (D-NH), Yea 
Shelby (R-AL), Nay 
Snowe (R-ME), Nay 
Specter (D-PA), Yea 
Stabenow (D-MI), Yea 
Tester (D-MT), Yea 
Thune (R-SD), Nay 
Udall (D-CO), Yea 
Udall (D-NM), Yea 
Vitter (R-LA), Nay 
Voinovich (R-OH), Nay 
Warner (D-VA), Yea 
Webb (D-VA), Yea 
Whitehouse (D-RI) Yea 
Wicker (R-MS), Nay 
Wyden (D-OR), Yea 
133 
APPENDIX E 
NATIONAL JOURNAL U.S. SENATE VOTER RATINGS, 1994 
Senate on issues Senator, Lib Economic Social Foreign, Conservative Economic Social Foreign Daniel K Akaka, D-Hawan 
84 76 60 0 19 39 Max Baucus, D-Mont 72 53 78 18 40 15 Robert F Bennett, R-Utah 18 0 29 77 85 70 Joseph R Biden Jr, 
D-Del 65 76 87 34 19 6 JeffBingaman, D-N M 61 53 51 35 40 46 Christopher S (Kit) Bond, R-Mo 32 27 16 67 71 82 
David L Boren, D-Okla 43 66 66 55 32 29 Barbara Boxer, D-Calif 84 75 78 0 24 15 Bill Bradley, D-N J 55 81 78 40 16 15 
John B Breaux, D-La 60 40 66 39 59 29 Hank Brown, R-Colo 0 16 23 88 81 74 Richard H Bryan, D-Nev 61 52 54 35 47 
43 Dale Bumpers, D-Ark 50 60 94 48 38 0 Conrad Burns, R-Mont 28 16 30 71 81 68 Robert C Byrd, D-W Va 55 35 54 40 
63 43 Ben Nighthorse Campbell, D-Colo 68 68 41 29 31 58 John H Chafee, R-R 35 74 45 64 25 54 Dan Coats, R-Ind 0 21 
20 88 75 78 Thad Cochran, R-Miss 33 2114 65 75 85 William S Cohen, R-Maine 36 65 15 63 34 84 Kent Conrad, D-N D 
55 53 58 40 40 40 Paul Coverdell, R-Ga 0 0 16 88 85 82 Larry E Craig, R-Idaho 0 0 0 88 85 94 Alfonse M D'Amato, R-
N Y 39 19 6 60 80 86 John C Danforth, R-Mo 33 47 39 65 52 60 Thomas A Daschle, D-S D 72 81 66 18 16 29 Dennis 
DeConcmi, D-Anz 72 50 63 18 49 35 Chnstopher J Dodd, D-Conn 84 85 61 0 7 38 Robert Dole, R-Kan 0 0 6 88 85 86 Pete 
V Domeruci, RN M 29 25 33 68 74 66 Byron L Dorgan, D-N D 61 63 66 35 35 29 Dave Durenberger, R-Minn 40 51 34 59 
48 62 J J Exon, D-Neb 53 44 44 46 55 55 Lauch Faircloth, R-N C 0 0 0 88 85 94 Russell Feingold, D-Wis 61 71 78 35 26 
15 Dianne Femstein, D-Cahf 72 66 51 18 32 46 Wendell H Ford, R-Ky 72 37 46 18 62 51 John Glenn, D-Ohio 68 85 58 29 
7 40 Slade Gorton, R-Wash 26 27 26 72 71 71 Robert Graham, D-Fla 55 70 63 40 29 35 Phil Gramm, R-Texas 24 20 6 75 79 
86 Charles E Grassley, R-Iowa 12 0 23 82 85 74 Judd Gregg, R-N H 0 31 30 88 67 68 Tom Harkin, D-Iowa 84 93 94 0 0 0 
Orrin G Hatch, R-Utah 18 0 26 77 85 71 Mark O Hatfield, R-Ore 49 46 87 50 53 6 Howell T Hefhn, D-Ala 47 43 42 52 56 
57 Jesse A Helms, R-N C 0 0 0 88 85 94 Ernest F Holhngs, D-S C 52 48 50 47 51 49 Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas 25 0 
6 74 85 86 Daniel K Inouye, D-Hawaii 84 76 57 0 19 42 James M Jeffords, R-Vt 43 85 72 55 7 22 J Bennett Johnston, D-
La 67 3851 32 61 46 Nancy Landon Kassebaum, R-Kan 29 42 43 68 57 56 Dirk A Kempthorne, R-Idaho 0 0 0 88 85 94 
Edward M Kennedy, D-Mass 84 84 66 0 15 29 Robert Kerrey, D-Neb 55 53 54 40 40 43 John F Kerry, D-Mass 72 85 72 
18722 HerbertH Kohl, D-Wis 48 63 785135 15FrankR Lautenberg, D-N J 84 81 72 0 16 22 Patrick J Leahy, D-Vt 84 
93 94 0 0 0 Carl Levin, D-Mich 84 85 72 0 7 22 Joseph I Lieberman, D-Conn 84 53 49 0 40 50 Trent Lott, R-Miss 23 0 6 
76 85 86 Richard G Lugar, R-Ind 18 30 34 77 69 62 Connie Mack III, R-Fla 12 26 6 82 73 86 Harlan Mathews, D-Tenn 50 
45 87 48 54 6 John McCam, R-Anz 0 0 18 88 85 80 Mitch McConnell, R-Ky 18 16 26 77 81 71 Howard M Metzenbaum, D-
Ohio 82 93 94 16 0 0 Barbara A Mikulski, D-Md 68 71 65 29 26 34 GeorBe J Mitchell, D-Maine 84 85 72 0 7 22 Carol 
Moseley-Braun, D-Ill 66 93 72 33 0 22 Daniel Patrick Moymhan, D-N Y 84 85 78 0 7 15 Frank H Murkowski, R-Alaska 12 
21 6 82 75 86 Patty Murray, D-Wash 84 85 86 0 7 13 Don Nickles, R-Okla 12 15 6 82 84 86 Sam Nunn, D-Ga 42 41 46 57 
58 51 Bob Packwood, R-Ore 37 60 34 61 38 62 Claiborne Pell, D-RI 72 93 87 18 0 6 Larry Pressler, R-S D 12 21 18 82 75 
80 David Pryor, D-Ark 46 62 94 53 37 0 Harry M Reid, D-Nev 72 53 62 18 40 37 Donald W Riegle Jr, D-Mich 84 71 78 0 
26 15 Charles S Robb, D-Va 72 76 46 18 19 51 John D (Jay) Rockefeller IV, D-W Va 84 69 85 0 30 14 William V Roth 
Jr, R-Del 26 31 32 72 67 67 Paul S Sarbanes, D-Md 84 76 87 0 19 6 Jim Sasser, D-Tenn 54 39 71 45 60 28 Richard C 
Shelby, D-Ala 45 29 40 54 70 59 Paul Simon, D-Ill 71 93 94 28 0 0 Alan K Simpson, R-Wyo 12 35 20 82 63 78 Robert C 
Smith, R-N H 0 0 0 88 85 94 Arlen Specter, R-Pa 41 49 38 58 50 61 Ted Stevens, R-Alaska 37 33 23 61 66 74 Strom 
Thurmond, R-S C 29 0 0 68 85 94 Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo 0 0 22 88 85 77 John W Warner, R-Va 18 34 34 77 65 62 Paul 
Wellstone, D-Minn 82 93 87 16 0 6 Harris Wofford, D-Pa 72 53 87 18 40 6 
To find composite liberal score of one Senator (Ex JohnW Warner) 
1 Add the three liberal issue scores 18+34+34=86 
2 Subtract each conservative score from 100 and add those figures 
100-77=23, 100-65=35, 100-62=38 23+35+38=96 
3 Add the answers from steps 1 and 2 and divide by six 86+96=182-6=30 3 
4 Sen Warner's 1994 composite liberal ratmg was 30 3 
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